UK to buy F-35As that can't be refueled from RAF tankers

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

US Dependence, Sovereignty & Nuclear Sharing

  • Many see the F‑35A purchase as deepening UK dependence on a “US closed garden”: US‑controlled weapons, parts, software, and potentially US veto power over nuclear use.
  • The aircraft are widely understood to be for a US nuclear‑sharing role, carrying only US tactical nukes with US/NATO authorization. Critics argue this makes the UK pay to follow US orders.
  • Others compare this to Trident: UK‑built warheads on US missiles, with disputed but at least partially independent control.
  • Some think the move is political “pandering” to the US for trade or diplomatic favors rather than a genuine capability need.

Refueling Issue & NATO Interoperability

  • Core article hook: F‑35As can’t refuel from RAF Voyager tankers (probe‑and‑drogue vs boom).
  • Several argue this is a minor, solvable problem: use US/NATO boom tankers in joint ops or acquire/modify RAF tankers; F‑35A variants with probes exist. The headline is called misleading / clickbait.
  • Others see it as emblematic of poor planning and dangerous reliance on allies for basic functions like refueling, especially given worries about US/NATO political stability.
  • A sub‑thread stresses NATO’s whole point is interoperability, and suggests the RAF’s tanker fleet is the real outlier.

Alternatives: European Fighters vs US Stealth

  • Debate over whether Europe has “comparable” options: Typhoon and Rafale (4.5‑gen) vs F‑35 (5th‑gen stealth), and future FCAS/GCAP projects not due before ~2040.
  • Some argue European doctrine emphasizes defensive airpower and less stealth, collaborating with US assets when deep‑strike stealth is needed.
  • Others counter that many European NATO states are buying F‑35s precisely because stealth is now a priority.

Industrial Autonomy vs Globalized Supply Chains

  • Strong current of opinion that the UK should “re‑industrialise,” rebuild full-spectrum defense manufacturing, and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers.
  • Counter‑arguments: modern systems are too complex for single‑nation production; UK industry is heavily hollowed‑out; even iconic UK systems depend on multinational firms and imported components.
  • Some welcome economic interdependence as a brake on UK military adventurism and argue resources should go to domestic welfare instead.

NATO, Russia Threat & Strategic Context

  • Heated disagreement over how real and urgent a Russian threat to Europe is:
    • One side cites Georgia, Crimea, full‑scale Ukraine invasion, and potential moves against the Baltics/Scandinavia as justification for rapid rearmament and tighter NATO integration.
    • The other side sees “looming war” rhetoric as manufactured to justify EU/NATO militarisation and US‑aligned purchases, noting the USSR never attacked NATO directly.
  • Trump’s impact on NATO is contested: some say he forced useful spending increases; others say he amplified Kremlin narratives, undermined Article 5, and made the US an unreliable partner.

F‑35 Program Costs, Control & International Experience

  • Swiss F‑35 and Patriot purchases are cited as cautionary tales: “fixed” prices rising, older configurations supplied, currency‑rate lock‑ins, huge maintenance bills, and secret contracts.
  • Commenters highlight that operating F‑35s ties countries to US export controls, Lockheed for parts and servicing, and potentially US‑held encryption keys or software control (details remain unclear).
  • Another thread notes the F‑35 itself depends critically on UK‑made components, and suggests deeper European integration as a better route to autonomy than purely national programs.