Proton joins suit against Apple for practices that harm developers and consumers

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Scope of the Lawsuit & Requested Remedies

  • Proton joined a class action alleging Apple unlawfully monopolizes iOS app distribution and payments.
  • Requested injunctions include: banning App Store exclusivity deals; allowing rival iOS app stores and preinstallation by OEMs/carriers; giving third‑party stores catalog access; forbidding mandatory Apple IAP; equal API access for third‑party apps; and allowing Apple IAP to be disabled.
  • Some commenters see parts as “insane” or unrealistic (e.g., carrier‑preloaded stores, access to Apple’s catalog, full parity with private APIs), but view others (alternative payments, rival stores) as reasonable.

Is Apple a Monopoly? Market Definition Fight

  • One side: Apple monopolizes iOS app distribution, not phones in general. If you can’t install software on an iPhone without Apple’s approval, that’s monopoly power over that market.
  • Other side: globally iOS is a minority; even in the US it shares the market with Android. Users can buy Android, flip phones, or no phone; developers can target the web or other platforms.
  • Counterpoint: in practice phones are essential, the market is a duopoly, and many services “must” support iOS. That dependency gives Apple enough power for antitrust concerns even without 90% share.

Ownership, Choice, and Walled Gardens

  • Recurrent theme: “I bought it, so I should control it” vs. “you knowingly buy into Apple’s rules.”
  • House/car/HOA analogies used both ways: some say “just don’t buy that house/car”; others say tying tires, ink, or groceries to one vendor is exactly why we regulate monopolies.
  • Several argue that contracts/ToS can’t override basic rights and that law exists precisely to limit what powerful firms can do with “their” platforms once they’re socially critical.

Security vs Openness & Sideloading

  • Pro‑Apple side: sideloading and alternative stores create huge malware vectors; phones now hold IDs, banking, health data; many regulated industries mandate iPhones as “more secure.”
  • Others respond: Android has allowed sideloading and third‑party stores for years; infections are real but manageable with permissions, sandboxing, and user prompts. Security shouldn’t justify permanent user lock‑in.
  • Debate over whether merely allowing sideloading materially lowers security for users who don’t use it, and whether Apple could expose a “power user” switch without nagging the majority.

Payments, the 30% Cut, and Tying

  • Many see Apple’s mandatory IAP and ban on in‑app links to external payments as classic tying/vendor lock‑in: to access iOS users, you must use Apple’s payment rails and give up ~30%.
  • Supporters liken it to mall rent: Apple provides infrastructure, global billing, refunds, compliance, fraud handling, and consolidated subscription management; 30% aligns with other major platforms.
  • Critics counter: on Android and PC (e.g. Steam), 30% is tolerable because alternatives exist; on iOS it’s effectively a tax backed by distribution monopoly. And Apple forbids price differentiation or even telling users about cheaper direct options.
  • There’s extensive pushback that “secure cancellations” do not logically require a 30% share, and that Apple is blocking other payment options mainly to preserve billions in high‑margin revenue.

Privacy, Ad‑Funded Apps, and Distorted Incentives

  • Proton’s key argument resonating with many: App Store fees hurt subscription‑based, privacy‑respecting services while ad‑funded, data‑harvesting apps pay nothing to Apple on “transactions” and thus gain a structural advantage.
  • Some agree this entrenches surveillance capitalism; others say the real problem is the ad model itself, not Apple’s cut.
  • Additional nuance: Apple’s own anti‑tracking moves (e.g. ATT) weakened smaller ad players but left giants with first‑party data stronger; Apple also runs its own growing ads business, raising conflict‑of‑interest concerns.

Safari, Web Lock‑In, and Alternative Browsers

  • Several argue Apple’s ban on non‑WebKit engines and its slow, buggy Safari effectively cripple web apps on iOS, forcing developers into native apps where Apple can charge 30%.
  • Others respond that Chrome is the real “new IE” culturally, and worry that opening engines on iOS just accelerates a Chrome monoculture.
  • Nonetheless, Apple’s browser‑engine restriction is widely cited as a core anticompetitive tactic (and already a focus of regulators elsewhere).

iMessage Lock‑In and Social Harm

  • One long subthread claims Apple’s deliberate isolation of iMessage is among the “most evil” big‑tech moves: leveraging social pressure and teen status anxiety (blue vs green bubbles) to force costly hardware adoption and lock‑in.
  • Evidence cited: internal Apple discussions acknowledging that bringing iMessage to Android would remove a major obstacle to families buying iPhones.
  • Others call this wildly overstated and say the real issue is social dynamics and user ignorance: families could choose cross‑platform apps (Signal, WhatsApp, etc.) but don’t.
  • Still, many see Apple’s intentional degradation of SMS/MMS experience and late support for RCS as a calculated lock‑in strategy with real social costs.

Comparisons to Steam, Consoles, Cars, and Printers

  • Supporters frequently compare Apple’s model to game consoles or Steam: closed stores with similar 30% cuts, curated environments, and no expectation of sideloading.
  • Critics answer that PCs and Android devices allow alternative stores and direct installs; on Steam Deck you can easily install non‑Steam games and other OSes. iOS is unique in fully tying hardware, OS, and store.
  • Car and printer analogies highlight how vertical control (parts, repairs, ink) can become abusive; some note that in other sectors law already limits OEM lock‑in (e.g. right‑to‑repair, EU auto rules).

Regulation vs “Vote With Your Wallet”

  • One recurring clash: “If you don’t like it, buy Android” vs “phones are unavoidable infrastructure, and app developers can’t realistically skip iOS; antitrust exists for this exact scenario.”
  • Some explicitly support using law to “break the backs” of mega‑corps and restore competition; others fear regulators will destroy a product many consumers explicitly want (a tightly locked‑down phone).
  • A middle position appears: keep Apple’s curated store and rules, but require that alternative stores and direct payments be allowed—and let users opt to stay entirely within Apple’s ecosystem if they prefer.