FCC bars providers for non-compliance with robocall protections

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Impact of Robocalls and Who Gets Hurt

  • Commenters stress that scams disproportionately target seniors and cognitively vulnerable people, with anecdotes of six‑figure losses and emotional manipulation (e.g., fake celebrity, “grandchild in trouble,” romance, fake jobs).
  • Several argue it’s wrong to blame victims as “idiots,” framing this instead as systemic exploitation similar to other predatory business models.

FCC Action: Welcome but Inadequate

  • Many welcome the FCC cutting off non‑compliant providers and some report an immediate drop in spam calls or texts.
  • Others see it as a minor “drop in the ocean,” expecting scammers to quickly re-route traffic via new intermediaries or legacy infrastructure.
  • Skeptical posters argue the FCC is not “doing everything in its power,” citing recurring waves of spam after past interventions (e.g., STIR/SHAKEN, Do Not Call).

Enforcement, Jurisdiction, and Deterrence

  • Strong calls to imprison executives of enabling telcos/VoIP providers, or hold them personally liable when they knowingly carry spam.
  • Some propose KYC‑style rules: if a carrier can’t identify the human behind spam, the carrier should face penalties.
  • Debate over foreign scammers: suggestions range from trade leverage and extraterritorial prosecution to hyperbolic calls for kinetic or clandestine action.

Technical and Structural Problems

  • Root causes identified: caller ID spoofing, legacy SS7, cheap VoIP access, and a network never designed for authentication.
  • PSTN is repeatedly described as anachronistic and structurally untrustworthy; others defend it as critical interoperable infrastructure that regulators must repair rather than replace.

Proposed Solutions

  • Network-level ideas:
    • Default‑deny or surcharge international or “unattested” calls.
    • Cryptographic attestation of caller identity (STIR/SHAKEN‑like, but stricter).
    • Blocking SS7 spoofing for numbers not proven owned; tighter US identity binding to numbers.
  • Economic ideas:
    • Per‑call fees/deposits or receiver‑pays/earns models to make spam uneconomical.
    • Fines on major carriers per robocall they deliver.
  • User-level ideas:
    • Contact‑only ringing, aggressive voicemail use, call screening, regex/area‑code filters, third‑party blockers, or switching to Pixel/Google Voice for strong spam controls.

International Comparisons

  • Multiple commenters say spam is far less prevalent in parts of Europe and Australia, attributing it to stricter regulators and carrier controls.
  • This is used as evidence that the US problem is political and incentive‑driven, not technically inevitable.