The World War Two bomber that cost more than the atomic bomb

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

B-29 capability, reliability, and cost

  • Thread notes the B-29 as a huge technical leap: pressurized, high-altitude, analog fire-control computers for each turret, ECM gear, and very powerful but temperamental engines (magnesium parts, fire risk).
  • Early B-29s were almost hand-built; massive quality issues (leaks, wiring faults, only ~20% flyable off the line).
  • Some argue that if B-29s had been available earlier in Europe, bomber crew mortality might have been lower, but others point out the B-29 was initially very unreliable—at one point training losses in the US exceeded combat losses.
  • Cost comparisons: B-29 program vs Manhattan Project; commenters also compare to the F‑35 and B‑2 as modern “most expensive weapons,” discussing program totals vs unit cost.

Strategic bombing, precision vs area bombing

  • Several comments emphasize that prewar US doctrine envisioned daylight “precision” bombing (helped by the Norden bombsight), but in practice accuracy was poor and target selection flawed.
  • The Norden sight is described as a major but ultimately disappointing investment, leading to a shift toward area bombing and massive civilian casualties.
  • Others reference British night area bombing and German/Japanese resilience: both increased weapons output despite bombing by dispersing industry.

Atomic vs conventional bombing of Japan

  • Some posters initially assume atomic bombs were uniquely destructive; others note that the Tokyo firebombing killed as many or more than either atomic strike.
  • Debate over whether Hiroshima and Nagasaki were deliberately “saved” as atomic targets; one side cites orders placing them off-limits in July 1945, another stresses that was only a month before the attacks.
  • Strong disagreement on motives:
    • One camp: bombs primarily to shock Japan into surrender and avoid a catastrophic invasion, citing Okinawa, coup attempts, and Japanese cabinet deadlock even after two bombs.
    • Another camp: Japan was already strategically finished and the bombs also (or primarily) signaled power to the USSR.
  • Multiple commenters stress that Japanese leadership understood these were atomic weapons and feared more might follow.

WW1 vs WW2 leadership and “incompetent generals”

  • Extended subthread challenges the common “lions led by donkeys” view of WW1:
    • One side argues generals were not uniquely incompetent; they were adapting to rapidly changing tech (artillery, machine guns), with poor comms and massive armies.
    • Opponents point to huge casualties, failure to internalize lessons from the US Civil War, and rigid offensive doctrines.
  • Consensus that high-intensity industrial war tends to produce horrific casualty rates regardless of era.

Industrial scale and modern analogies

  • Commenters marvel at wartime US production (e.g., bombers rolling out nearly one per hour) and contrast it with today’s slower, more complex acquisition.
  • Threads branch into comparisons with modern systems (F‑35, B‑52 longevity, B‑2 maintenance) and side debates about US vs European manufacturing quality (including cars and aircraft).