The thousands of atomic bombs exploded on Earth (2015)

Moral framing and responsibility

  • Several comments push back on framing Soviet testing as uniquely reckless, noting the US actually used nukes on cities and conducted extensive, harmful testing on its own civilians and territories.
  • Others emphasize that all nuclear powers (US, USSR/Russia, UK, France, etc.) caused serious harm; there are “no good guys” in test history.
  • Some criticize the article’s nationalistic tone as out of step with the documented health and environmental damage.

Physics and design of large bombs

  • Discussion of Tsar Bomba:
    • It was deliberately “under-fueled” (lead instead of U‑238 tamper) to halve yield and reduce fallout and give the delivery aircraft a chance to survive.
    • Very large yields are increasingly inefficient: damage scales with radius, so energy requirements grow faster than area; much of the blast “sphere” ends up in space.
  • Teller‑Ulam design is scalable in principle, but ultra‑large bombs are tactically inferior to multiple smaller warheads.
  • MIRVs are noted as serving both efficiency (many smaller blasts) and penetration (harder to intercept).

Neutron bombs and tactical nukes

  • Neutron bombs are described as small fusion devices tuned for high neutron output, essentially thermonuclear weapons without a fission third stage.
  • Debate over their destabilizing effect: some argue low‑fallout weapons could make going nuclear politically easier; others highlight the moral nightmare of leaving “dead men walking” on the battlefield.

Health and environmental impacts of testing

  • US and UK tests caused cancers, sickness, and environmental damage (Nevada, Bikini, Australia), often covered up by authorities.
  • Mention of “bomb pulse” (global carbon‑14 spike) used as a scientific dating marker.

Civil defense, “duck and cover,” and survivability

  • One thread argues duck‑and‑cover is pragmatically useful beyond ground zero, analogous to tornado drills or the Chelyabinsk meteor: it can save you from glass and debris.
  • Others see it as fostering an illusion that full‑scale thermonuclear war is societally survivable.
  • Extended debate over Soviet vs US doctrine: whether Soviet strategy emphasized escalation dominance and elite survival, and whether such brinkmanship is “rational” or catastrophically reckless.
  • Disagreement over how survivable nuclear war would be:
    • One side predicts widespread collapse, famine, marauding, and possible nuclear winter.
    • Another argues many regions (especially in the southern hemisphere and rural interiors) would avoid direct hits, EMP effects are overstated, and postwar life would be grim but not Mad‑Max‑level chaos.

Nuclear winter and scale of destruction

  • Some commenters are skeptical, likening nuclear‑winter narratives to exaggerated AGI doom, citing huge volcanic eruptions humans have survived.
  • Others clarify that tests don’t falsify nuclear winter because:
    • Most tests were underground or over non‑flammable areas.
    • Real nuclear winter depends on large yields over cities and forests (soot) with firestorms lifting smoke above rain layers.
  • There is no consensus in the thread; views range from “overblown fearmongering” to “credible scenario if arsenals are fully used on cities.”

Risk of nuclear war and historical near‑misses

  • Several references to past close calls: Cuban Missile Crisis (naval depth‑charging of nuclear subs), 1983 Soviet false alarm, and a recent missile incident in Poland.
  • Some cite expert annual risk estimates (≈1–3%/year), implying high cumulative lifetime risk, while acknowledging past outcomes relied heavily on luck and individual restraint.

Culture, media, and public perception

  • Commenters mention Cold War civil‑defense media (“The Complacent Americans”), the Fallout game manual, and fiction like “Tomorrow!” and “Silly Asses” to illustrate shifting attitudes toward nuclear survivability and absurdity.
  • One person notes basic protective advice (e.g., don’t look at the flash, duck and cover) is no longer widely known despite ongoing risk.