NYC Telecom Raid: What's Up with Those Weird SIM Banks?

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Likely Purpose of the SIM Banks

  • Many commenters think the setup is classic “SIM bank / modem pool” infrastructure used for:
    • SMS spam and bulk messaging
    • Receiving SMS verification codes for mass account creation
    • Grey‑route VoIP termination (making international calls appear as local)
    • “Residential” mobile proxies for scraping, ad click fraud, and social‑media bots
  • Some see nothing exotic: similar systems are widely sold on Alibaba/Aliexpress and have long been used in gray‑market telecom.

Fraud vs. Terrorism Narrative

  • Several participants argue the “can crash the cell network” / terrorism framing from authorities is exaggerated:
    • The hardware and density align with bulk fraud/scam operations, not a network‑disruption tool.
    • Concentrating this many radios would mainly stress a single cell sector, not citywide service.
  • Others caution against dismissing the official line, suggesting law enforcement may have additional, undisclosed evidence.
  • A few note the scale (hundreds of servers, ~100k SIMs, near the UN) and cost as unusually large, making them skeptical it’s “just normal spam.”

Why NYC and Carrier Detection

  • NYC is seen as attractive because:
    • Very high cell density and traffic, so abnormal use blends in.
    • Many retail outlets and MVNO options to buy SIMs (even with cash).
  • Discussion of why carriers/MVNOs don’t stop this:
    • MVNOs often lack per‑cell data and mostly see bulk traffic and billing info.
    • Both MVNOs and host carriers have limited incentive if the traffic is paid for and not visibly degrading service.
    • Effective anti‑spam controls cost money; externalities are pushed onto society.

Hardware, Scale, and Economics

  • Devices are described as high‑density GSM/LTE modem pools with dozens of antennas and hundreds of SIM slots per unit.
  • Labor to insert and manage SIMs is considered manageable; cost estimates in the thread range from tens of thousands per site to low millions overall, viewed as plausible for large‑scale fraud.
  • Technical side notes cover RF interference, SIM rotation to evade detection, and parallels with legacy VoIP gateways.

eSIMs and Messaging Protocols

  • Some speculate eSIMs could either obsolete this hardware or at least reduce labor.
  • Others argue eSIM adoption is pushed mainly by carriers and phone makers for cost/space reasons, not to help spammers.
  • Observations that spam usually arrives via plain SMS, not iMessage/RCS, align with this hardware’s capabilities.

Ethics and Media Framing

  • A sub‑thread questions whether detailing hardware, prices, and sourcing veers into a “how‑to” for spam farms.
  • Counter‑argument: all information is easily discoverable already; public understanding and better technical/legal countermeasures matter more than obscurity.