FAA is granting Boeing “limited delegation” to certify airworthiness

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Overall Reaction to FAA’s “Limited Delegation”

  • Many see this as the FAA once again refusing to fully do its job and returning to a system that already failed with the 737 MAX.
  • Strong distrust that Boeing has meaningfully changed its safety culture; repeated statements of “I won’t fly Boeing if I can avoid it.”
  • Some view the move as driven by lobbying and political influence rather than safety, with references to Boeing’s HQ move near Washington, DC and government dependence on Boeing.

What the Delegation Actually Covers

  • Several aerospace professionals explain this is about in‑house FAA delegates/DERs issuing airworthiness certificates for specific tail numbers, not type certification of new designs.
  • The delegated task is to confirm that a given aircraft matches the already‑approved type design and that any deviations are documented and resolved.
  • This delegation model is described as longstanding and industry‑wide (also used by Airbus, Embraer, etc.), with the FAA still able to revoke delegation or ground fleets.

Debate: Conflict of Interest vs. Practical Necessity

  • Critics argue that having delegates paid by Boeing creates an inherent conflict; they see this as regulatory capture that undermines adversarial review.
  • Others counter that:
    • Delegates must be individually approved by the FAA and can lose careers if they sign off unsafely.
    • In practice, they often have significant autonomy and can overrule management.
    • Aviation is heavily audited, including by insurers, and paperwork per aircraft is enormous.
  • A recurring theme: the FAA lacks the budget and specialized staff to independently match manufacturer expertise without massive funding increases.

Safety Systems, Process, and Accountability

  • Some argue that robust documented processes and personal/legal liability for engineers and managers could reduce cheating.
  • Others respond that paperwork is easy to fake, audits are often shallow or announced, and real deterrence would require aggressive, visible punishment that rarely occurs.

Broader Concerns: Boeing, Monopolies, and Alternatives

  • Commenters link Boeing’s decline to prioritizing sales, cost-cutting, and lobbying over engineering, and to a quasi‑monopoly situation where regulators are reluctant to truly punish.
  • Preference for Airbus is common, though some note Airbus and others use similar delegation structures and have their own issues.