Boeing has started working on a 737 MAX replacement

Scope of the “737 MAX Replacement”

• Thread assumes this is a genuinely new single‑aisle airframe, not another 737 stretch, likely targeting the A321/A321XLR / former 757 “middle of the market” segment.
• Many expect it to be fly‑by‑wire with heavy use of composites and next‑gen engines, following lessons (good and bad) from the 787.
• Several note the 737 family is geometrically constrained (short gear, limited engine diameter); a clean sheet would allow taller gear and better-placed large high-bypass engines.

Engines, Performance, and Legacy Designs

• Debate over whether a “757 MAX”–style revival is viable: older 757 airframes are heavy and its ~40k‑lb thrust engines no longer have a modern, economical counterpart.
• Comparison of A321 and 757: A321 seen as underpowered “dog” vs. 757 “rocket ship,” driven by thrust-to-weight rather than magic aerodynamics.
• Discussion of next-gen engine choices: geared turbofans vs. open‑rotor concepts; both Boeing and Airbus appear to be timing new airframes to when these are ready.

Avionics, CPUs, and Certification Inertia

• Long subthread on why aircraft still use very old CPUs: certified hardware is well‑understood, extremely reliable, and re‑certifying new silicon is costly and slow.
• Skeptics argue this “if it ain’t broke” attitude leads to eventual dead-ends: parts become unobtainable, toolchains obsolete, and expertise ages out.
• Clarification that the MAX uses a specific certified flight control processor, not literally 80286 chips, but the broader concern about obsolescence remains.

MCAS, Design Philosophy, and Safety Culture

• Many see MCAS as a business-driven hack to preserve 737 type commonality (avoid pilot retraining) rather than an aerodynamic necessity.
• Some argue modern airliners already use MCAS‑like “envelope protection” safely; the problem was Boeing’s half‑baked, poorly documented, single‑sensor implementation.
• Strong sentiment that the next design must avoid “software band‑aids” for airframe compromises and instead integrate stability, automation, and training from the start.

Boeing’s Organizational Capacity and Culture

• Repeated concern that Boeing no longer has the in‑house capability or culture to execute clean-sheet programs: brain drain, extreme outsourcing, finance‑driven leadership.
• 787 and Starliner cited as evidence: supply-chain chaos, cost overruns, long delays, even if the 787 is now a solid airplane in service.
• Some argue a new design is urgent simply to preserve Boeing’s “design a new airliner” competence before it decays further.

Competition and Market Structure

• Airbus A220 is praised as a modern, comfortable narrowbody; Boeing currently has no direct answer and previously responded via trade action, not product.
• COMAC’s C919 is viewed as technologically behind today but China’s industrial trajectory and subsidies are seen as a long‑term competitive threat.
• Several note Boeing is effectively “too strategic to fail” and would be bailed out by the US government if necessary.

Passenger Experience, Airlines, and Economics

• Participants stress that cramped “sardine” cabins are primarily airline choices (seat pitch/width and configuration), constrained by evacuation rules and cost pressure.
• Some hope a new airframe might improve passenger comfort, but many doubt airlines or Boeing will prioritize this over density and fuel burn.

Trust, Regulation, and Public Perception

• Multiple commenters say they actively avoid flying on the MAX or on Boeing at all, out of anger rather than strict risk calculus.
• There is worry that FAA oversight is drifting back toward lenient self‑certification despite past failures.
• Others warn that boycotts risk leaving only Airbus (and eventually COMAC) and that Boeing’s health is tied to US strategic interests, not just the market.