Apple's Unlawful Evil

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Consumer reactions & limited alternatives

  • Several commenters say they’re done buying Apple hardware or will drastically reduce purchases, but note ecosystem lock‑in and lack of viable alternatives.
  • Buying refurbished Apple gear is debated: some see it as harm reduction, others say it still props up Apple’s brand, resale value, and social visibility.
  • A few are experimenting with alternatives (GrapheneOS, PostmarketOS, Sailfish/Jolla, “FuriPhone”) and even de‑smartphoning, but worry non‑technical users have almost no realistic escape.

App stores, walled gardens, and ownership

  • Core complaint: the problem isn’t just Apple pulling an app, it’s that iOS forbids alternative stores and real sideloading, so users can’t install disfavored but legal software.
  • Some suggest PWAs as a workaround; others argue that:
    • iOS PWA support is incomplete/buggy (push, IndexedDB, icons), and
    • crowdsourced tools like ICEBlock die if installation is too frictional.
  • Xcode sideloading is acknowledged but seen as too cumbersome and limited to matter at scale.

Google, Android, and open‑source alternatives

  • Google’s parallel removal of ICEBlock is noted; disagreement over whether Android’s AOSP and alternate stores meaningfully improve freedom.
  • One side: open-source base + alternative ROMs provide a safety valve.
  • Other side: AOSP effectively needs proprietary blobs, Google has been tightening control and DRM for a decade, and is moving toward an Apple‑style lock‑in.

Corporations, government power & blame

  • Major split on culpability:
    • Some emphasize government overreach, saying companies are reacting to existential threats from the state and voters should curb state power.
    • Others argue mega‑firms wield enormous leverage, benefit from state protection, and have a responsibility to resist unlawful demands instead of acting as “lapdogs.”
  • Debate over whether criticizing Apple implicitly means wanting “more government power,” versus simply enforcing existing limits and civil rights.
  • Example comparisons: Apple’s posture in China/Russia vs its aggressive resistance to EU regulation and sideloading.

Tech solutions vs political struggle

  • One camp warns against “technical utopianism”: apps, VPNs, duress PINs, etc. are at best temporary workarounds; determined states can block servers, trace users, or kick devices off networks. Real fixes are political and institutional.
  • Others counter that secure, user‑controlled tech is a prerequisite for organizing, fundraising, media access, and international contact; dismissing activist tools undermines movements.
  • Long subthread contrasts “existential” symbolic challenges (boycotts, sit‑ins, blank paper protests) with “tactical” tech/weapons, and whether logistics or hearts‑and‑minds matter more in successful revolutions.

Web, browsers, and platform power

  • Some stress keeping the web open as a hedge against app‑store censorship and a “one-browser + Cloudflare” chokepoint future.
  • Apple’s ban on non‑WebKit engines is contested:
    • Defenders say it’s a bulwark against a Chrome monoculture.
    • Critics call it monopolistic and argue more engines could improve real‑world security by reducing reliance on a single vulnerable stack.

Assessing Apple’s justification & the article itself

  • Apple’s “safety risk” rationale is called vague and credulous; suggested counterpoints include demanding actual evidence of harm and acknowledging that many risky apps (rideshare, dating, generative AI) are allowed.
  • Some think Apple is simply lying and acting to protect a lucrative, politically mediated relationship with the U.S. administration; others give them partial benefit of the doubt but insist this shows why their gatekeeping power is dangerous.
  • Reactions to the article’s tone are mixed: some find it hyperbolic or clickbaity; others say its core critique of feudal, locked‑down computing is accurate and timely.

Workarounds, PWAs, and practical limits

  • Suggestions include building fully featured PWAs (via React Native or similar) to escape app‑store vetoes and help open‑source phones become “daily drivers.”
  • For ICEBlock‑style apps, commenters highlight hard privacy and scalability constraints:
    • Avoiding a central user/location database is difficult outside Apple’s push/iCloud stack, and such a DB would be highly subpoena‑ and attack‑prone.
    • Web Push standards exist, but iOS’s weak implementation and Apple’s control over notifications again limit what’s possible.