Ryanair flight landed at Manchester airport with six minutes of fuel left
What Actually Happened on the Flight
- Flight from Pisa to Prestwick:
- Two approaches and go-arounds at Prestwick due to ~100 mph winds.
45 minutes in the Prestwick pattern, then diversion to Edinburgh (15–20 min).- One more failed approach at Edinburgh, then diversion to Manchester (~40–45 min).
- Landed at Manchester with
220 kg of fuel (5–6 minutes at average burn), reportedly below legal final reserve.
Fuel Rules and Why This Is Serious
- Commenters familiar with regulations state:
- Commercial jets must be planned to land with 30–45 minutes of fuel after flying to destination, then alternate, plus holding and multiple go-arounds.
- As soon as it’s clear landing will encroach on final reserve, a fuel Mayday is legally required; that reportedly happened here.
- Landing with minutes left is described as “within the error bars” of gauges and “as close to a fatal accident as possible,” not a normal use of reserve.
Was This “Working as Intended” or a Failure?
- One camp: reserves did their job in a worst-case, highly abnormal weather scenario (three go-arounds at two airports, extra ~2 hours airborne).
- Opposing camp: you are never supposed to actually consume final reserve; entering that state is itself a major incident that demands investigation.
- Key unknowns flagged: when “minimum fuel” and Mayday were declared; whether diversion from Prestwick to Edinburgh (not straight to Manchester or another clearer airport) was reasonable given the evolving weather.
Ryanair, Cost Pressure, and Safety Record
- Several note Ryanair’s excellent accident record and strict regulation around fuel uplift.
- Others point to past low-fuel emergencies and media reports alleging pressure to tanker minimal fuel and to use fuel emergencies to jump landing queues.
- Consensus: motive and company culture are open questions; investigation, not speculation, should decide.
ATC, Training, and Systemic Factors
- Some blame “overworked ATC and undertrained pilots”; others counter that European and US commercial pilot training and fuel-planning rules are very stringent.
- ATC understaffing and recent near-collisions (e.g., Nice) are cited as broader risk factors, but not clearly causal here.
Safety Engineering Perspective
- Multiple comments invoke the “Swiss cheese model” and “hazardous state” thinking:
- Running into final fuel reserve is a defined hazardous state that must almost never occur.
- Near misses are to be investigated as seriously as accidents, to preserve safety margins.
- Several pilots and engineers emphasize that using reserve is like hitting a crash barrier: it means something upstream went wrong, even if everyone walks away.