How Airbus took off

Airbus vs Boeing: who “took off”?

• Several commenters ask whether Airbus truly “won” or Boeing mainly imploded.
• The delivery charts are cited: Airbus’ rise began ~25 years ago, long before Boeing’s recent crises.
• Key advantage noted: Airbus had a newer single-aisle design with enough ground clearance for modern engines, while Boeing kept stretching the 737 instead of funding a clean-sheet replacement.
• Boeing’s handling of the Bombardier CSeries is framed as a major strategic blunder that handed Airbus another strong product.

737 MAX, “airframe” arguments, and safety failures

• Long subthread debates whether the MAX fiasco was an “airframe problem” or an integration/software/training problem.
• One side: the 737 airframe is excellent and well‑matched to the market; the real issue was mixing it with incompatible engines and then hiding aerodynamic instability behind MCAS.
• Other side: the low ground clearance is now fundamentally incompatible with 21st‑century engine needs; making it work required dangerous compromises, so calling the airframe “great” is misleading.
• Related issues raised: grandfathered systems (e.g. lack of modern EICAS), anti‑ice certification delays, door‑plug failure, outsourced manufacturing (Spirit, fuselage rings), and Southwest’s “no-simulator-training” contract incentives.

Culture, organization, and politics

• Airbus is described as unusually good at putting customers first despite being a political project: early adoption of English and US standards, tough choices on engines and workshare.
• Some describe an engineering‑driven culture where day‑to‑day politics felt limited; others report intense sniping, especially in “innovation” offshoots. One theory: mistrust and internal adversarialism help avoid groupthink.
• French/German collaboration is seen by some as complementary (creative but sloppy vs process‑rigid but precise), though others report Airbus as a slow, bureaucratic, multi‑national maze.

Industrial policy, capitalism, and “European conservatism”

• Thread contrasts Airbus’ state-backed, safety‑first, conservative model with Boeing’s financialization, outsourcing, and Wall Street pressure.
• Some argue this exposes a failure mode of US‑style capitalism; others note Airbus also had serious scandals and is itself a product of state‑driven mergers and subsidies.
• The article’s portrayal of Europe as a “graveyard of failed champions” is heavily disputed; commenters point to many large European firms and to Concorde/Ariane as important, if imperfect, precursors.

Future competition and broader innovation

• COMAC’s slow progress is mentioned as one to watch, especially if China solves the engine issue.
• Some expect eventual disruption of the duopoly via new tools and automation, if regulators allow it.
• Several commenters question big‑tech “innovation” narratives, arguing legacy tech giants now resemble complacent Boeing more than fast‑moving upstarts.