Time to start de-Appling

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Site & terminology issues

  • Many report the article’s CSS cutting off text on wide screens due to a large negative margin-right; workaround is resizing or zooming. Several give specific CSS fixes.
  • “De-Appling” is interpreted as “stopping using Apple products/services,” especially iCloud and ADP, analogous to “de-Googling.”
  • Multiple archive links are shared due to the site being overloaded.

Apple vs UK government: where blame lies

  • Strong consensus that the root problem is UK law (Investigatory Powers Act, Technical Capability Notices), not Apple.
  • Several point out the article itself explicitly says Apple is on the “right side” by withdrawing ADP rather than weakening it globally.
  • Some still feel the title implicitly blames Apple or misleads readers into thinking Apple is the main villain.

Legal scope and gatekeeper concerns

  • A key worry: Apple (and Google) are centralized “gateways” to everyone’s data; forcing them to weaken E2EE compromises entire populations at once.
  • Others counter that once governments normalize access via big gatekeepers, they will move on to criminalizing attempts to store data out-of-jurisdiction or use strong encryption at all.
  • There’s discussion of ongoing UK and US legal actions alleging Apple technically and UX-wise locks users into iCloud (“Restricted Files,” “choice architecture”).

Practical responses: de-Appling, de-Googling, de-Americanizing

  • Debate over whether moving away from Apple/US services helps UK users:
    • Skeptics argue any successful provider serving UK users will face the same demands; the real issue is UK policy.
    • Others still prefer non‑US or non‑5‑Eyes providers (e.g., European clouds, Proton), or self‑hosting, to reduce mass-surveillance exposure.
  • Many note that while DIY E2EE is straightforward for experts (Syncthing, restic, Cryptomator, VeraCrypt, rclone crypt, NAS/VPS), it’s unrealistic for most people and fragile for families.
  • iOS in particular is seen as hostile to third‑party backup/sync, making de‑Appling harder than de‑Googling.

Limits of technical fixes & threat models

  • Commenters emphasize that in the UK you can be compelled to disclose passwords; refusal can be a crime, so FOSS or self‑hosting only mitigates bulk surveillance, not targeted coercion.
  • Hidden volumes, fake accounts, and “I forgot the passphrase” are mentioned, but others note these don’t scale and rely on high personal risk tolerance.

De‑UK vs political change

  • Some argue the only real fix is political: electing different governments or pushing back on surveillance laws; others are pessimistic about voting’s effectiveness.
  • “De‑UKing” (emigration to Ireland, EU, US, etc.) is proposed half‑seriously as more effective than technical workarounds, though immigration barriers are noted.

Views on Apple, Google, and privacy

  • Apple is simultaneously described as:
    • The “least bad” major consumer company on privacy and uniquely willing to drop features rather than add backdoors, and
    • A marketing-driven, closed ecosystem that already cooperates with US surveillance and uses lock‑in to grow services revenue.
  • Some see Apple’s refusal to silently weaken ADP (and inability to turn it off remotely) as genuine evidence of a stronger design, even if imperfect.

Broader surveillance & authoritarianism concerns

  • Thread repeatedly connects UK moves to a wider trend: 5 Eyes countries, “war on terror” legacy, and increasing normalization of surveillance and data access.
  • Several warn that continually “retreating” from mainstream tech (de‑Appling, going off‑grid) shrinks the space of freedom unless matched by political resistance.