Flight disruption warning as Airbus requests modifications to 6k planes

Current Airbus Issue and Solar Radiation Explanation

• Discussion centers on Airbus’s finding that intense solar radiation corrupted data in an ELAC flight‑control computer, causing a sudden altitude drop on a JetBlue A320 and triggering a global directive affecting ~6,000 aircraft.
• Many note it’s positive that action is being taken before a crash, contrasting implicitly with other manufacturers, while also stressing Airbus’s own history of serious incidents.
• Some are skeptical of “solar radiation” as a catch‑all explanation and want more technical detail and reproducible evidence.

Software vs Hardware Mitigation

• A large subset of aircraft will be fixed via a software update that is reportedly a rollback; ~2,000 need hardware modifications.
• Commenters debate how software can mitigate radiation: ideas include better checksums, voting algorithms, watchdogs, and redundancy rather than shielding alone.
• Others suggest alternative root causes such as power‑bus glitches, solid‑state relay failures, or bugs in failover/voting logic between redundant computers.
• There is discussion about old designs lacking ECC/EDAC and newer hardware being more hardened, but legacy fleets will remain vulnerable for years.

Pilot Error vs System Design (AF447, Qantas 72, etc.)

• Long subthread revisits previous Airbus accidents: stall events, mode changes when sensors fail, and independent sidesticks with no tactile cross‑feedback.
• One side emphasizes multiple documented crew errors and CRM breakdowns; the other argues that confusing automation modes, poor HCI, and hidden complexity made “pilot error” almost inevitable.
• The idea that accidents result from interacting technical, organizational, and human factors, not just “bad pilots,” is strongly argued.

QA, Redundancy, and Fly‑by‑Wire

• Aerospace software QA is described as far more rigorous and well‑funded than typical tech, but still bounded by assumed environmental ranges and commercial pressure.
• Some express unease that fly‑by‑wire places software between pilots and control surfaces; others note mechanical systems also fail and that Airbus uses triply redundant, dissimilar computers.

Radiation Risk to Passengers and Crew

• Side discussion notes that passengers face minimal additional cancer risk, but frequent‑flying aircrew have measurably higher risk from high‑altitude radiation.