Apple has locked my Apple ID, and I have no recourse. A plea for help

Scope and severity of the lockout

• Commenters see this as a particularly bad case: decades of purchases, photos, devices and a developer account effectively disabled.
• Many stress the distinction between “closing an account” and “confiscating access to data and devices”; several compare it to a bank seizing deposits.
• The inability to get a concrete reason or meaningful appeal is called Kafkaesque; the emoji-laden support replies are viewed as insultingly flippant.

Vendor lock‑in, “all‑in” cloud dependency, and victim‑blaming

• Some argue it was reckless to keep a “single copy” of critical data (photos, documents, credentials) in one proprietary cloud and treat an Apple ID as a “core digital identity.”
• Others push back: on mainstream platforms that dominate devices and services, this is “the main street, not a dark alley”; expecting non‑technical users to self‑host and design backup schemes is unrealistic.
• There’s recognition that “convenience as a drug” led many to accept walled gardens; several say this should be a wake‑up call that it “can happen to you.”

Gift cards, fraud, and AML

• Many suspect aggressive fraud or anti–money‑laundering (AML) systems were triggered by the high‑value gift card, noting gift cards are widely used in scams and laundering.
• Several describe known scams where physical cards are tampered with in stores, or where victims are forced to buy gift cards for scammers.
• Critics question why the entire Apple ID and devices are disabled instead of just blocking gift‑card use, calling it a “hammer to crack an egg.”
• Some resolve never to buy or redeem Apple gift cards; others note cards are often discounted or used to avoid storing card details with big tech, so the risk is non‑obvious.

Law, regulation, and recourse

• Strong calls for regulation: rights to data export on closure, transparent reasons for bans, and independent appeal/ombudsman processes, especially given IDs gate devices and sometimes government services.
• EU GDPR export rights and local civil/administrative tribunals (e.g., in Australia) are suggested as partial levers; others recommend demand letters or small‑claims actions to reach corporate legal teams.
• AML secrecy rules are cited as a possible reason Apple won’t explain the trigger, but several argue this doesn’t justify permanent, opaque lockouts of long‑standing accounts.

Backups, self‑hosting, and realistic mitigations

• Large thread on mitigation strategies: Time Machine with “download originals,” rsync/Arq to NAS or S3/Backblaze, Synology/Immich/Nextcloud/PhotoPrism, multi‑cloud mirroring (iCloud + Google Photos + OneDrive).
• Several note hard limits: iCloud “optimize storage” makes full local copies hard once libraries exceed local disk; backing up iMessages, shared iWork docs, and passkeys is especially tricky.
• Some argue 3–2–1 backup and avoiding single‑provider dependence is now essential; others say this is far beyond what average users can or will do, reinforcing the case for legal protections.

Platform power and broader implications

• Many generalize beyond Apple: similar horror stories from Google, PayPal, Amazon, banks; “live by Big Tech, die by Big Tech.”
• Concerns that government digital IDs and critical services increasingly depend on iOS/Android, amplifying the danger of unilateral “de‑platforming.”
• A minority advocate abandoning Apple/Google entirely in favor of Linux/BSD or smaller providers; others argue that, for most people and businesses, that’s not currently realistic.