Ireland wants to give its cops spyware, ability to crack encrypted messages

Technical limits, backdoors, and platforms

• Many see “making it technologically impossible” as futile because governments can simply force major providers to add backdoors, undermining cryptography.
• Predicted trajectory: state‑sanctioned proprietary OSes with remote attestation from big vendors, required for accessing essential services and most of the internet.
• Alternative or custom software might not be outright banned but treated as suspicious, triggering searches or watchlists.
• Some suggest decentralised tools and extra encryption layers (e.g. PGP over existing E2EE), but others argue phones remain inherently vulnerable across the hardware–OS–app stack.

Law, repression costs, and chilling effects

• One view: you can build strong privacy tools, but the state can just criminalise their use; the core problem is political, not technical.
• Counter‑view: if millions adopt strong encryption, large‑scale repression becomes too expensive; critics respond that individuals can’t really “price out” a determined state.
• Concern that criminalising privacy tools enables selective enforcement: legal political activity (e.g. protests) can be punished via unrelated “crypto” violations, chilling dissent.

Human factors and operational security

• Several note there is no purely technical fix for human problems; coercion can defeat any password.
• Advice offered: avoid creating records of illegal activity; if necessary, store sensitive material offline and physically hidden.

Police effectiveness, duty, and accountability

• Multiple high‑profile failures (Romania, Greece, various US cases including non‑intervention during ongoing attacks) are cited to question claims that more powers mean more protection.
• Discussion of US doctrine that police generally have no constitutional duty to protect individuals; disagreement over how to interpret that and how it compares internationally.
• Frustration that officers are rarely prosecuted for inaction or abuse, with qualified immunity and structural incentives blamed.

Motivations and global synchrony

• Many note similar surveillance pushes across countries and see a broad trend: more digital data driving more state appetite for monitoring and “functional erosion” of rights.
• Suggested drivers include national‑security briefings (war/terror scenarios), loss of reliance on foreign intelligence, fear of foreign influence via social media, and industry lobbying.
• Others downplay conspiracy explanations, pointing instead to public fear, media narratives, and police simply seeking tools that make their jobs easier.

Ireland‑specific concerns and policing priorities

• Some Irish commenters highlight long wait times and basic understaffing, arguing energy is going into building a “cyberpolice” instead of fixing everyday safety and response.