FBI is buying location data to track US citizens, director confirms

Scope of FBI Surveillance

• Many argue the FBI’s mandate to investigate crime does not extend to mass, warrantless surveillance of citizens.
• Others see targeted use of purchased data as potentially useful to prevent serious crimes (e.g., terror attacks), but critics say this justification can excuse almost any abuse.
• There is concern that buying bulk data enables “parallel construction” and investigations without probable cause.

Constitutionality and Legal Loopholes

• Multiple comments view this as an “end-run” around the Fourth Amendment via the third‑party doctrine.
• Carpenter v. United States is cited: it required warrants for historical cell-site data, but its ruling is narrow.
• Some argue buying app/broker location data is legally distinct because users “consent” in app terms; others counter that consent to app collection is not consent to government search.
• Anti‑Pinkerton–style arguments appear: the government shouldn’t be able to contract out what it can’t legally do directly.
• Several note that whether it’s unconstitutional in practice depends on courts that often defer to “national security.”

Data Brokers, Adtech, and Corporate Incentives

• Detailed supply chain described: apps → ad SDKs → real-time bidding exchanges → data harvesters → aggregators → government buyers.
• Accountability is said to “dissolve” at each layer; everyone claims they’re just handling “commercially available data.”
• Core driver is profit: companies collect and sell data because it’s lucrative and weakly regulated.
• Some developers may be unaware that embedded SDKs exfiltrate location data; others knowingly monetize it.

Technical Limits of “Burner” and Privacy Tactics

• Comments highlight how “shadow profiles,” differential identification, and unique movement patterns make true anonymity extremely hard.
• Using burner phones is portrayed as fragile and pattern‑revealing; others push back that some claims are overstated, though still one signal among many.

Policy and Mitigation Proposals

• Suggested reforms:
  • Outlaw government purchase of commercial location data without warrants.
  • Overturn or greatly narrow the third‑party doctrine.
  • Treat location like wiretapped audio/video requiring explicit, per‑party consent.
  • Impose severe penalties (including executive liability) for unlawful collection/sale of personal data.
  • Make possession of certain data troves itself illegal or highly regulated.
• Some advocate privacy‑preserving products, minimal app installs, DNS/ad blocking, and stricter OS‑level controls, while noting platform owners could do much more but lack incentives.