Why the US Navy won't blast the Iranians and 'open' Strait of Hormuz

Commenters weigh whether the U.S. could realistically force open the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that Iran’s missiles, drones, and geography make any attempt to secure the Gulf militarily enormously costly and likely unwinnable. Many note that cheap, proliferated drones and anti-ship weapons have eroded traditional carrier-based power projection and expose gaps in U.S. doctrine, logistics, and industrial capacity. The thread also highlights political constraints: domestic opposition to a large ground invasion, fear of escalation with regional powers, and the risk that a prolonged, inconclusive conflict would damage U.S. leadership more than Iran’s regime.

Limits of Force in the Strait of Hormuz

  • Many argue the US cannot truly “open” the Strait, only temporarily reduce risk.
  • Iran doesn’t need full control of the waterway; just the ability to intermittently hit or credibly threaten tankers anywhere in the Gulf.
  • Even a few successful strikes on tankers likely makes commercial shipping and insurance untenable, effectively closing the route.

Drones, Missiles, and Changing Naval Warfare

  • Cheap drones and missiles enable “area denial” against expensive ships and aircraft.
  • Key asymmetry: millions‑dollar interceptors vs tens‑ to hundreds‑thousand‑dollar drones; magazine depth becomes decisive.
  • Some say this shows “carrier era is fading”; others counter that carriers remain central for long‑range airpower and have been heavily used in this war, just from stand‑off range.
  • Debate over how vulnerable carriers are to large swarms and whether future anti‑drone tech (lasers, guns, APKWS, etc.) will rebalance things.

Ground Invasion and Logistics Impracticality

  • Multiple comments stress that securing the Strait would, in practice, mean securing much of Iran’s Gulf coastline and hinterland.
  • That implies a Gulf‑War‑plus‑scale land campaign across mountains and hostile terrain, with no obvious staging bases and immense logistical challenges.
  • Consensus: politically and militarily, a full invasion is extremely unlikely; small raids (e.g., on islands) would be risky and of limited value.

US Industrial & Strategic Weaknesses

  • Long subthread on US manufacturing fragility: loss of basic industrial capacity (fasteners, smelting, chemicals), supply‑chain dependence on China and others, and slow ability to retool.
  • Others push back, noting substantial remaining US and North American industrial output, but agree flexibility and scale‑up speed are problems.
  • Several tie this to munitions stockpiles and inability to sustain high‑volume modern warfare against a serious peer.

Politics, Public Opinion, and War Aims

  • Repeated theme: the war’s objectives are unclear; bombing alone cannot seize territory, change regimes, or keep chokepoints open.
  • Iran’s strategic goal is seen as simply surviving and prolonging the conflict, making the war politically catastrophic for the US president.
  • Comments highlight strong anti‑war sentiment in US polling, internal Republican splits, and limited congressional appetite for escalation.
  • Some fear any serious US losses (e.g., a sunk carrier) could be used as pretext for extreme escalation, including nuclear use; others doubt institutional checks.

Ethics, Civilian Targets, and Historical Echoes

  • Many are disturbed by casual talk of “carpet bombing,” “depopulation,” and attacks on power and desalination infrastructure, noting these are widely viewed as war crimes.
  • Comparisons to Russia’s strikes on Ukraine’s grid, past US wars (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan), and WWI–style attrition underscore skepticism that strategic bombing can “win.”
  • Several see this conflict as repeating well‑known historical mistakes: overconfidence in airpower, underestimating nationalist resistance, and ignoring hard‑won lessons about needing infantry to hold territory.

Geopolitics: Iran, China, Russia, Europe

  • Discussion that every barrel of Iranian oil going to China still affects the global “single market”; attempts to strangle Iran risk wider economic shock.
  • China is portrayed as hedging and benefiting from US overreach; Russia as supplying Iran with intelligence and seeking high oil prices.
  • Ukraine’s drone and ISR innovations are cited as a preview of future warfare; there is active cooperation between Ukraine and European states, while US support is seen as wavering.
  • Broader thread of declining trust in US reliability among allies, driven by recent US political volatility and the current war.