Why the US Navy won't blast the Iranians and 'open' Strait of Hormuz

Limits of Force in the Strait of Hormuz

• Many argue the US cannot truly “open” the Strait, only temporarily reduce risk.
• Iran doesn’t need full control of the waterway; just the ability to intermittently hit or credibly threaten tankers anywhere in the Gulf.
• Even a few successful strikes on tankers likely makes commercial shipping and insurance untenable, effectively closing the route.

Drones, Missiles, and Changing Naval Warfare

• Cheap drones and missiles enable “area denial” against expensive ships and aircraft.
• Key asymmetry: millions‑dollar interceptors vs tens‑ to hundreds‑thousand‑dollar drones; magazine depth becomes decisive.
• Some say this shows “carrier era is fading”; others counter that carriers remain central for long‑range airpower and have been heavily used in this war, just from stand‑off range.
• Debate over how vulnerable carriers are to large swarms and whether future anti‑drone tech (lasers, guns, APKWS, etc.) will rebalance things.

Ground Invasion and Logistics Impracticality

• Multiple comments stress that securing the Strait would, in practice, mean securing much of Iran’s Gulf coastline and hinterland.
• That implies a Gulf‑War‑plus‑scale land campaign across mountains and hostile terrain, with no obvious staging bases and immense logistical challenges.
• Consensus: politically and militarily, a full invasion is extremely unlikely; small raids (e.g., on islands) would be risky and of limited value.

US Industrial & Strategic Weaknesses

• Long subthread on US manufacturing fragility: loss of basic industrial capacity (fasteners, smelting, chemicals), supply‑chain dependence on China and others, and slow ability to retool.
• Others push back, noting substantial remaining US and North American industrial output, but agree flexibility and scale‑up speed are problems.
• Several tie this to munitions stockpiles and inability to sustain high‑volume modern warfare against a serious peer.

Politics, Public Opinion, and War Aims

• Repeated theme: the war’s objectives are unclear; bombing alone cannot seize territory, change regimes, or keep chokepoints open.
• Iran’s strategic goal is seen as simply surviving and prolonging the conflict, making the war politically catastrophic for the US president.
• Comments highlight strong anti‑war sentiment in US polling, internal Republican splits, and limited congressional appetite for escalation.
• Some fear any serious US losses (e.g., a sunk carrier) could be used as pretext for extreme escalation, including nuclear use; others doubt institutional checks.

Ethics, Civilian Targets, and Historical Echoes

• Many are disturbed by casual talk of “carpet bombing,” “depopulation,” and attacks on power and desalination infrastructure, noting these are widely viewed as war crimes.
• Comparisons to Russia’s strikes on Ukraine’s grid, past US wars (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan), and WWI–style attrition underscore skepticism that strategic bombing can “win.”
• Several see this conflict as repeating well‑known historical mistakes: overconfidence in airpower, underestimating nationalist resistance, and ignoring hard‑won lessons about needing infantry to hold territory.

Geopolitics: Iran, China, Russia, Europe

• Discussion that every barrel of Iranian oil going to China still affects the global “single market”; attempts to strangle Iran risk wider economic shock.
• China is portrayed as hedging and benefiting from US overreach; Russia as supplying Iran with intelligence and seeking high oil prices.
• Ukraine’s drone and ISR innovations are cited as a preview of future warfare; there is active cooperation between Ukraine and European states, while US support is seen as wavering.
• Broader thread of declining trust in US reliability among allies, driven by recent US political volatility and the current war.