Brexit Ten Years On: The Economy

Brexit’s economic legacy a decade on is portrayed as a modest but real drag on UK growth, trade, and investment, especially compared with the US, while leaving both the UK and EU underperforming their potential. Commenters contrast the promised “sovereignty and savings” with outcomes such as new trade frictions, reduced freedom of movement, and weakened soft power, noting that many forecasts of harm were broadly borne out even if hard to isolate in GDP data. The exchange also situates Brexit within a wider backlash against globalization, arguing that de‑globalization has not restored lost manufacturing jobs or helped the working class, and warning that similar policies elsewhere could deepen long‑term decline.

Brexit vs. US Political Turmoil

  • Several participants compare Brexit with recent US political chaos.
  • Some argue US institutional damage, soft-power loss, and flirtation with authoritarianism are worse than Brexit’s mainly economic self‑harm.
  • Others say Brexit is still uniquely bad because the UK lacks US‑level bargaining power and exited its main trading bloc in one move.

Prospects of Rejoining the EU

  • Polls are cited suggesting a slim majority of Britons would now rejoin, but:
    • Another poll suggests most oppose giving up Brexit-derived powers even for closer EU ties.
    • Commenters say people may like “rejoin” in the abstract, but a real campaign would be brutal and reopen deep wounds.
    • Rejoin would likely require big concessions (e.g., on currency), and rising anti‑EU parties make this politically unlikely.
  • Some note you can’t “rewind”; any future relationship would be on worse terms than pre‑Brexit.

Economic Impact and Data Disputes

  • One view: EU and UK growth since Brexit are very similar; the US massively outperformed both, implying Brexit’s direct effect is modest and other factors dominate.
  • Counter‑view: Similar performance can also mean Brexit hurt both UK and EU; and the meaningful metric is the gap between promises and reality.
  • Specific claims:
    • Some data show UK GDP per capita growth since 2020 slightly better than major EU economies; others note:
      • Effects started after the 2016 vote (e.g., business investment).
      • UK accounting changes around COVID distort 2019–2020 comparisons.
  • Institutions like the UK fiscal watchdog and independent researchers are cited as estimating a 4–5.5% GDP hit versus a no‑Brexit baseline.
  • One commenter flatly denies any measurable negative impact and dismisses prior expert forecasts as discredited.

Free Movement, Youth, and Services

  • Ending free movement and market access for services is widely seen as a major cost.
  • Some argue harm to young Britons is more symbolic than real, noting few actually studied in the EU before and can still go with visas.
  • Others reply that affected people themselves overwhelmingly oppose Brexit, and intangible opportunities (mobility, perspective) matter even if not visible in GDP.

Globalization and De‑globalization

  • Several comments frame Brexit as part of a wider backlash against globalization.
  • Pro‑globalization view: freer trade was a net benefit; reversing it doesn’t bring back jobs or factories and mainly entrenches gains of capital owners while making everyone poorer.
  • Critics argue:
    • “Globalization” here really means a US‑centric order that is open when it suits US interests and coercive when it doesn’t.
    • Use of military and currency power undercuts the idea of a neutral free market.

Campaign Narratives, Lies, and Referendum Design

  • Strong agreement that the Leave campaign used misleading claims, especially on redirecting EU contributions to domestic priorities like healthcare.
  • Some insist Brexit was mainly sold on sovereignty and immigration, with economic downsides framed as an acceptable unknown.
  • Others say economic promises (“we will save X per week”) were central and later immediately walked back.
  • Several argue:
    • The referendum should have required supermajorities and/or consent from all UK nations.
    • There should have been a second vote on the actual exit deal; many doubt the final deal would have passed.

EU Regulation, Alternatives, and Small States

  • Some claim EU regulation (e.g., GDPR, AI Act) has harmed Europe’s tech sector and that large, centralized structures are less effective than city‑states or highly decentralized systems.
  • Others challenge oversimplifications:
    • Switzerland is highly regulated; calling it “no‑regulation” is inaccurate.
    • Norway and Switzerland’s non‑membership is tied to already high prosperity and stability; they have little incentive to accept full EU obligations.