Brexit Ten Years On: The Economy

Brexit vs. US Political Turmoil

  • Several participants compare Brexit with recent US political chaos.
  • Some argue US institutional damage, soft-power loss, and flirtation with authoritarianism are worse than Brexit’s mainly economic self‑harm.
  • Others say Brexit is still uniquely bad because the UK lacks US‑level bargaining power and exited its main trading bloc in one move.

Prospects of Rejoining the EU

  • Polls are cited suggesting a slim majority of Britons would now rejoin, but:
    • Another poll suggests most oppose giving up Brexit-derived powers even for closer EU ties.
    • Commenters say people may like “rejoin” in the abstract, but a real campaign would be brutal and reopen deep wounds.
    • Rejoin would likely require big concessions (e.g., on currency), and rising anti‑EU parties make this politically unlikely.
  • Some note you can’t “rewind”; any future relationship would be on worse terms than pre‑Brexit.

Economic Impact and Data Disputes

  • One view: EU and UK growth since Brexit are very similar; the US massively outperformed both, implying Brexit’s direct effect is modest and other factors dominate.
  • Counter‑view: Similar performance can also mean Brexit hurt both UK and EU; and the meaningful metric is the gap between promises and reality.
  • Specific claims:
    • Some data show UK GDP per capita growth since 2020 slightly better than major EU economies; others note:
      • Effects started after the 2016 vote (e.g., business investment).
      • UK accounting changes around COVID distort 2019–2020 comparisons.
  • Institutions like the UK fiscal watchdog and independent researchers are cited as estimating a 4–5.5% GDP hit versus a no‑Brexit baseline.
  • One commenter flatly denies any measurable negative impact and dismisses prior expert forecasts as discredited.

Free Movement, Youth, and Services

  • Ending free movement and market access for services is widely seen as a major cost.
  • Some argue harm to young Britons is more symbolic than real, noting few actually studied in the EU before and can still go with visas.
  • Others reply that affected people themselves overwhelmingly oppose Brexit, and intangible opportunities (mobility, perspective) matter even if not visible in GDP.

Globalization and De‑globalization

  • Several comments frame Brexit as part of a wider backlash against globalization.
  • Pro‑globalization view: freer trade was a net benefit; reversing it doesn’t bring back jobs or factories and mainly entrenches gains of capital owners while making everyone poorer.
  • Critics argue:
    • “Globalization” here really means a US‑centric order that is open when it suits US interests and coercive when it doesn’t.
    • Use of military and currency power undercuts the idea of a neutral free market.

Campaign Narratives, Lies, and Referendum Design

  • Strong agreement that the Leave campaign used misleading claims, especially on redirecting EU contributions to domestic priorities like healthcare.
  • Some insist Brexit was mainly sold on sovereignty and immigration, with economic downsides framed as an acceptable unknown.
  • Others say economic promises (“we will save X per week”) were central and later immediately walked back.
  • Several argue:
    • The referendum should have required supermajorities and/or consent from all UK nations.
    • There should have been a second vote on the actual exit deal; many doubt the final deal would have passed.

EU Regulation, Alternatives, and Small States

  • Some claim EU regulation (e.g., GDPR, AI Act) has harmed Europe’s tech sector and that large, centralized structures are less effective than city‑states or highly decentralized systems.
  • Others challenge oversimplifications:
    • Switzerland is highly regulated; calling it “no‑regulation” is inaccurate.
    • Norway and Switzerland’s non‑membership is tied to already high prosperity and stability; they have little incentive to accept full EU obligations.