LG to ban residential proxies from smart TV apps

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

LG plans to ban residential proxy SDKs from webOS smart TV apps after research showed that a large share of its app store was letting third parties route traffic through users’ home connections. Commenters see this as long-overdue action against what they characterize as spyware-like monetization schemes that can enable scraping, fraud, and legal or contractual risk for unwitting consumers. The episode reinforces broader distrust of “smart” TVs, with many advocating never putting TVs on the internet, using external streamers instead, and pushing for stronger regulation and scrutiny of connected appliances.

Scale of the Issue and LG’s Response

  • Many are stunned that ~42% of webOS apps reportedly included residential proxy SDKs; some call this outright malware/spyware.
  • Others question the statistic’s usefulness (counting apps, not installs or usage).
  • Commenters ask why this was ever allowed and see LG’s platform as a de facto malware delivery channel.
  • The ban is welcomed but seen as reactive and incomplete without addressing already-installed apps or broader privacy abuses.

Residential Proxies: Consent, Legality, and Risk

  • Strong view: bundling proxy nodes into unrelated apps is unethical, akin to joining users to a botnet.
  • Concerns include: fraud, spam, social manipulation, DDoS, ISP terms violations, and legal exposure for the subscriber.
  • Some argue limited “informed, prominent consent” could make it acceptable, but others say normal users (and especially kids) cannot meaningfully consent.
  • A minority worries that blanket bans could also block legitimate, voluntarily run proxies and conflict with software freedom.

Smart TVs, Tracking, and Alternatives

  • Widespread sentiment: never connect TVs to the internet if you can avoid it; use consoles, Apple TV, Chromecast, Fire Stick, or mini‑PCs instead.
  • Many prefer LG’s OLED panels but distrust its software; common pattern is “update once, then permanently offline.”
  • Users report aggressive ACR, ads, hardcoded DNS, and, separately, LG monitors triggering adware installs on Windows via drivers.

Defensive Practices and “Dumbing Down” TVs

  • Tactics: separate VLAN/guest networks, Pi-hole plus router DNS interception, blocking DoH endpoints, power strips, disabling or removing Wi‑Fi/Bluetooth modules.
  • Some note TVs may try open Wi‑Fi; others haven’t seen this and call it unclear.
  • There is interest in commercial “signage” panels or open-source frontends, but options are limited and often pricey.

Responsibility and Regulation

  • Many see this as systemic: TVs subsidized by data collection, weak ISP and regulator enforcement, and lax app-store vetting.
  • Calls for: legal limits on such SDKs, stronger consumer protections, and tech reviewers treating privacy/security as first-class criteria.