Everything I own, owned

Large language models are now helping hobbyists and security engineers reverse‑engineer device firmware, bypass vendor restrictions, and extend or “de‑cloud” everything from webcams and monitors to cat feeders and smart lights. Commenters see this as a potential breakthrough for right‑to‑repair and fighting planned obsolescence, since tedious reverse engineering that once took weeks can now be done in hours. At the same time, many warn this will accelerate an arms race: manufacturers may respond with stricter cryptographic lock‑down and regulators are already pushing “secure update” rules that could further limit true hardware ownership.

LLMs as Reverse-Engineering Assistants

  • Many commenters report success using LLMs/agents to reverse engineer file formats, smart devices, UPSes, TVs, GPUs, lab equipment, pet feeders, smart lights, etc.
  • Key value: tedious protocol/file-format work becomes feasible for niche hardware; tasks that once took weekends can take hours.
  • Some note LLMs often build on existing open‑source tools, raising questions about how much is “new” versus rediscovered. Others caution about “kayfabe” (models seeming to reason while recalling training data).

Ownership, Right to Repair, and Planned Obsolescence

  • Strong enthusiasm for using AI to defeat planned obsolescence and cloud dependence (e.g., offline smart lights, pet feeders, TVs, Kindle, home automation, receivers, old phones).
  • Philosophical stance from many: hardware owners should fully control and reflash their devices, including replacing vendor keys.
  • Others worry about non‑technical users bricking devices or ending up less secure.

Security Risks of Peripherals & WebUSB/WebHID

  • Discussion of how browsers exposing USB/HID/Bluetooth lets websites potentially reflash or backdoor peripherals (mics, keyboards, MD players, etc.).
  • One side sees permission prompts as insufficient; users will routinely click “allow” and can’t grasp firmware‑level risk.
  • Others argue these APIs have existed for years without major incidents and that the threat model is overblown.
  • General realization: any USB‑C device can morph roles, making “it’s just a mic/monitor” a weak assumption.

Arms Race: Lockdown vs Openness

  • Many expect manufacturers to respond with stronger signing, encryption, secure boot, and account binding, especially now that LLM‑assisted RE is trivial.
  • Some welcome this as improving security for the majority; others stress “closed ≠ secure” and see it as anti‑ownership.
  • There is hope for a market of deliberately open, user‑serviceable hardware.

AI Guardrails, Models, and Access

  • Mixed experiences with safety filters: some easily get models to write exploit code; others hit “cybersecurity” refusals even for benign debugging.
  • Workarounds mentioned: developer/security‑oriented access programs, alternative providers, Chinese/open‑weight models, and local setups.

OLED Pixel Cleaning & UX

  • Long side‑thread on intrusive “pixel cleaning” prompts on OLED monitors/TVs:
    • Some insist the maintenance is essential to prevent burn‑in.
    • Others argue it should be automatic/silent or fully user‑configurable, and use it as a prime example of why they want firmware control.