America didn't lose its rare earth industry, it sold it

America’s retreat from rare earth mining and processing is framed less as an accidental loss and more as a deliberate sell-off driven by decades of cost-cutting, offshoring, and financialization. Commenters argue this has created strategic vulnerabilities to China and other suppliers, while tying into broader trends like deindustrialization, automation-driven job loss, and the political consequences of short-term profit maximization. Some see renewed state involvement or even nationalization as necessary to rebuild critical supply chains, whereas others contend that high-tech, automated manufacturing and global interdependence are an inevitable feature of mature economies.

Market forces and deindustrialization

  • Many argue rare earths and other industries moved abroad because of clear price signals: cheaper energy, labor, laxer pollution rules, lower legal/regulatory costs, and scale advantages elsewhere.
  • Some see this as rational short‑term behavior but disastrous long‑term, enabled by political systems that don’t reward strategic thinking.
  • Others say this is broader than rare earths: the US “sold” manufacturing and built an economy around finance, software, and services.

Geopolitics, China, and narratives of blame

  • One camp says China’s export curbs are a proportional response to US tech sanctions; another sees China as using economic interdependence as leverage.
  • There’s disagreement over whether Xi’s leadership fundamentally changed China’s trajectory or whether Western “globalists” misread it all along.
  • Some insist an open, democratic China would still pursue national self‑interest and regional dominance; others stress authoritarianism as the core concern.
  • Views on China’s “evil” status are sharply divided, with comparisons to Western military interventions.

Manufacturing vs jobs in the US

  • Multiple comments stress the US is still a huge manufacturer; what declined is employment, largely attributed to automation, not just offshoring.
  • Others counter that offshoring and policy choices did matter, and that losing an “industrial commons” is strategically dangerous.
  • Debate centers on whether the key metric should be output, jobs, or diversified domestic capacity.

Rare earth resources vs processing bottlenecks

  • Several posts note rare earths are geologically common but economically hard to concentrate and separate, especially the heavier elements.
  • The real chokepoint is chemical separation and processing, where China has dominant capacity.
  • Startups and projects in the US and allies are mentioned, but many are small, slow‑moving, or financially shaky. Prior Chinese price flooding and bankruptcies are cited as a warning.

Policy, environment, and capitalism

  • Stringent US regulations, NIMBYism, and unpredictable government actions are blamed for discouraging long‑horizon industrial investment.
  • Others emphasize that all mining is environmentally destructive, so communities resist it regardless of commodity.
  • Some see the outcome as “capitalism at its finest”: short‑term profit, externalized risks, and strategic vulnerability; others argue markets and global supply chains mostly worked, and only “bad actors” and shocks break them.