Dutch 'idealist' bank ASN blocks non-Google Android, including GrapheneOS

A Dutch “ethical” bank, ASN, is blocking its Android app on devices running privacy-focused custom ROMs like GrapheneOS, citing Google’s Play Integrity checks and requirements tied to the new EU payment scheme Wero. Commenters argue this effectively forces customers onto Google- or Apple-certified platforms for basic banking and payments, even though many banks still allow insecure, unpatched stock Android devices. The thread broadens into concerns about regulatory pressure, remote attestation as a lock‑in mechanism, the limits of EU “open banking,” and how hard it is in practice for consumers to switch to more accommodating banks.

Play Integrity / SafetyNet and Blocking Custom ROMs

  • Many EU banks now use Google Play Integrity (successor to SafetyNet) to block non‑Google Android, including GrapheneOS, /e/OS, LineageOS, and even some rooted stock ROMs.
  • Several posters note that older, unpatched but Google‑certified devices still pass, so Play Integrity is seen as enforcing vendor control more than real security.
  • Some apps only block new signups or disable features (e.g., biometrics, higher limits) on GrapheneOS; others fully block or silently break.

Wero / iDEAL Migration

  • The Dutch iDEAL system is being migrated to Wero.
  • At least one bank attributes the custom ROM ban to Wero “security requirements”; Wero support docs explicitly list ROMs like LineageOS as unsupported.
  • Other Dutch banks reportedly run Wero without enforcing Play Integrity yet; unclear if this will change as Wero rolls out further.

Security, Regulation, and Liability

  • Banks are described as highly conservative due to liability for fraud and strong EU rules (e.g., PSD2, strong customer authentication).
  • Defenders say root/custom‑ROM blocking comes from audits, pentest “best practices,” and regulators’ expectations, even when technically weak.
  • Critics argue this is security theater: banks accept huge real risks (unpatched Android, poor password rules, SMS 2FA) while aggressively blocking niche but hardened systems.

APIs, Open Banking, and User Data Access

  • PSD2 / “open banking” exists but is seen as business‑to‑business only: individuals usually cannot directly access their own bank via those APIs.
  • Many posters resent having to grant third‑party fintechs access just to get transaction data.
  • A few banks and fintechs (e.g., some EU banks, Wise) are praised for proper, documented user APIs and webhooks; others’ PSD2 APIs are called unstable or poorly documented.

User Workarounds and Bank Diversity

  • Reported workarounds:
    • Using banks that still tolerate custom ROMs or only warn on root.
    • Keeping a separate stock iOS/Android device in a drawer for banking.
    • Using web banking with hardware tokens or SMS where still available.
  • Experiences vary widely by bank and country: some still support web + hardware tokens and in‑branch onboarding; others are app‑only and even phasing out websites.

EU Sovereignty, Lock‑In, and Policy Responses

  • Strong concern that EU “sovereign” payment schemes (Wero, EU digital ID) now depend on Google Play Integrity and even run on US cloud providers.
  • Some advocate regulation: mandate web access with feature parity, require non‑Google attestation (e.g., AOSP/GrapheneOS attestation), or ban remote attestation for essential services.
  • Others argue for market pressure (“vote with your wallet”), but many doubt this works when all major banks converge on the same practices and switching is costly.