Unlocking any car from X brand in most of the world

Researchers describe how they were able to remotely unlock and start internet-connected vehicles from a major automaker worldwide by exploiting hard‑coded credentials and poorly secured APIs in the carmaker’s web and mobile infrastructure. Commenters try to infer the likely brand, debate whether “connected car” features like app-based unlock and remote start are worth the security and privacy risks, and note that traditional theft methods remain easier for most criminals. Many see this as emblematic of a broader problem: automakers adding complex online services without the security culture or incentives needed to protect critical systems and customer data.

Video, article quality, and codecs

  • Several commenters liked the technical content but criticized the demo video (loud bleeps, portrait→landscape mid-clip, auto-blurred text).
  • Some found the write-up clear; others thought it was clunky, especially due to the redacted brand and missing context.
  • A side thread debates video codec choices: some can’t play the H.265 video in Firefox; others say Firefox supports it and H.264 is outdated.
  • There’s disagreement on whether H.265/AV1 actually give better quality at equal bitrate; some cite Netflix data favoring AV1.

Which automaker was hacked?

  • The article redacts the brand, which many find frustrating or “clickbaity.”
  • Multiple commenters infer it is Toyota/Lexus based on:
    • The car in the video resembling a RAV4 / RX.
    • Color scheme and UI of the admin panel.
    • Similar APIs documented in an open-source client for that ecosystem.
  • Others suggest alternatives (Hyundai/Kia, Isuzu, JLR), but the consensus in the thread leans Toyota/Lexus, while acknowledging legal risk and deliberate nondisclosure.

Security flaws and industry practices

  • Core mistake: admin/API credentials compiled into client-side JavaScript, reused across environments, and insufficient server-side auth.
  • Some argue finding competent security engineers is hard; others say talent exists but companies under-invest because security doesn’t drive revenue.
  • Commenters highlight simple rules that were violated (no hardcoded creds, no shared prod/non-prod secrets, static analysis to catch this).
  • There’s frustration that companies often attack or ignore researchers instead of hiring or rewarding them.

Connected cars: usefulness vs. risk

  • Many question why internet-controllable locks/remote start exist at all, calling them unnecessary attack surface and “enshittification.”
  • Others defend features: remote start in extreme climates, remote lock/unlock when forgetting keys, crash/emergency calling, tracking stolen vehicles.
  • Some argue the real issue is control and data use, not connectivity per se; call for regulation to give drivers control over data and capabilities.
  • Fears that disabling connectivity may eventually break inspections/insurance; worries about data collection and government/corporate surveillance.

Locks, theft, and practicality

  • Several note that physical theft often involves smashing windows or using cheap key programmers, not sophisticated remote exploits.
  • Others stress that a scalable remote exploit (unlock/start for many vehicles) is qualitatively different from per-car physical attacks.
  • Broader reflection that both home and car locks mainly deter opportunistic criminals; skilled or organized attackers can bypass most defenses.