Doomsday: Friday, 13 November, A.D. 2026 (1960)
A 1960 tongue‑in‑cheek paper that extrapolated human population growth to an “infinite” doomsday in 2026 is used as a springboard to examine why simple trend‑based predictions so often fail. Commenters contrast past overpopulation fears with today’s worries about aging and shrinking populations, debate whether poverty, politics, or sheer numbers drive problems like war and climate change, and argue over the limits of technological fixes and economic growth. Many see the episode as a caution against naive extrapolation—whether about demographics, climate, or AI superintelligence—without accounting for feedback loops, constraints, and social change.
Extrapolation and the “Doomsday” Paper
- Many see the paper as a clever illustration that naïve extrapolation (e.g., hyperbolic growth “to infinity”) breaks down once constraints appear.
- Others note that mocking bad extrapolation doesn’t justify complacency; risks like nuclear war or AI still need case‑by‑case analysis.
- Several point out that sigmoid curves look exponential “until they don’t,” and people routinely miss saturation or feedback limits.
Population Growth, Decline, and Fertility
- Some argue overpopulation fears from the 1960s–70s (e.g., famine predictions) did not materialize; population is now nearing a peak and rich countries worry about decline.
- Others counter that rapid fertility collapse (e.g., sub‑replacement rates, aging pyramids) may cause severe economic and social shocks.
- Debate over causes:
- Social: women’s emancipation, higher living costs, education, urbanization, changing values.
- Biological: one commenter worries there is an unexplained global decline in biological fertility; others say data mostly matches social explanations.
Population vs. Poverty, War, and Innovation
- One camp claims “too many people” drive most problems: climate change, resource depletion, migration, conflict.
- Critics say this is simplistic and often political:
- Wars and migration are mainly about power, institutions, and inequality, not sheer headcount.
- Hunger and scarcity are framed as distribution and governance failures, not global shortages.
- Disagreement over whether more people mainly worsen strain or also boost innovation via more minds, competition, and specialization.
Climate Change and Ecological Risk
- Some are relatively optimistic: climate change likely won’t end humanity; tech and increasing prosperity may leave people better off in 100 years.
- Others see this as dangerous techno‑optimism, noting:
- Desertification, sea‑level rise, more extreme weather, water stress, and mass displacement.
- Existing aquifer depletion and fragile, just‑in‑time global systems.
- Several stress that high emissions come disproportionately from a small, wealthy minority and specific industries, not “humanity in general.”
Economics, Aging, and Redistribution
- Widespread concern about pay‑as‑you‑go pension systems and fewer workers supporting more retirees.
- Proposed responses include: reforming financial systems, raising retirement ages, boosting productivity via technology, and/or more immigration.
- Sharp disagreement over whether reducing poverty primarily requires free markets and growth or wealth redistribution and stronger social programs.
Technology, AI, and Cultural Notes
- Some extrapolation‑skeptics extend that doubt to superintelligent AI and “data centers in space”; others call this inconsistent cherry‑picking.
- Thread references older overpopulation fiction vs. newer depopulation themes, and uses the paper as a cautionary tale against straight‑line “singularity” predictions.