LockBit says it's leaked 50GB of stolen Boeing files after ransom fails to land
A ransomware attack on Boeing by the LockBit group, which claims to have leaked 50GB of files after an unpaid ransom, prompts debate over how valuable such stolen corporate data really is and who might want it, from rival manufacturers to intelligence agencies. Commenters question whether paying ransoms ever makes sense, given unverifiable promises that data will be deleted, and argue for stronger corporate liability and possibly outlawing ransom payments to reduce incentives for attacks. The thread also delves into the ethics and legality of examining leaked data, and how chronic underinvestment in cybersecurity and bug bounties leaves even critical infrastructure and defense contractors exposed.
Ransomware dynamics and data leakage
- Once data is exfiltrated, many argue it should be treated as already leaked; the real question is “when,” not “if.”
- Some ransomware groups cultivate a reputation for honoring promises not to leak if paid, to maximize future payouts.
- Others note reputations are unreliable: groups can fragment, individuals can keep copies, and data can be resold or handed to governments.
- There’s debate over whether data is always exfiltrated: sometimes it is only encrypted in place, which is easier to verify.
Nature and potential value of the Boeing leak
- Early inspection suggests mundane “parts and distribution” data: backups, logistics, Citrix/Ivanti services, etc.
- For casual curiosity or “build your own jet engine” enthusiasts, it looks uninteresting.
- Several point out that logistics, supplier lists, and internal systems info are extremely valuable for social engineering and supply-chain attacks.
- 50GB is small relative to full product CAD or all corporate email, but could still contain highly sensitive documents or embarrassing correspondence.
Ethics and legality of accessing leaked data
- Some see further downloading/analysis as compounding the victim’s harm and effectively acting as “enforcers” for extortionists.
- Others feel less sympathy for Boeing due to past negligence (e.g., 737 MAX crashes), raising whether that justifies ignoring their confidentiality.
- Legally, commenters highlight copyright and trade-secret exposure, plus possible anti-terrorism implications if data aids attacks; overall advice is to avoid using such data commercially.
- There is explicit uncertainty on the exact legal boundaries; several emphasize this is not legal advice.
Who might want this data
- Suggested buyers: state actors (e.g., China, Russia, North Korea, Iran), industrial competitors, and intelligence agencies.
- Some doubt there’s a strong legitimate commercial market for raw Boeing maintenance/operational data, compared to structured datasets sold by specialized providers.
- Others think it could support IP theft, cheaper parts manufacturing, or refined predictive maintenance models.
Security posture, incentives, and bug bounties
- Ransomware groups may have a smaller attack surface than global enterprises; being “more secure than their victims” is seen as plausible.
- The ransomware ecosystem is described as highly modular (developers, access brokers, data sellers, monetizers), distributing risk.
- White-hat work and bug bounties are viewed as underpaid and risky compared with cybercrime, skewing incentives.
Use in courts and evidence doctrine
- Discussion notes that illegally obtained evidence can be admissible if the government didn’t commit or direct the underlying crime.
- “Fruit of the poisonous tree” is said to apply mainly to government misconduct, not private hackers.
Policy ideas: banning ransom payments
- One proposal: make paying ransoms illegal (with liability for executives) to starve the business model.
- Concerns: governments and critical contractors might still need escape valves; laws might include national-security exceptions or be overridden in practice.
- Some expect international alliances to discourage ransom payments, especially when adversarial states likely already have the stolen data.