Russia's glide bombs devastating Ukraine's cities on the cheap
Cheap Russian glide kits bolted onto large Soviet-era bombs are enabling devastating strikes on Ukrainian cities from well outside Ukrainian air defenses, highlighting how low-cost “good enough” weapons can offset weaker air superiority. Commenters debate why Ukraine and its allies have not fielded similar capabilities at scale, pointing to limited aircraft, political limits on striking Russian territory, GPS/GLONASS jamming, and fears of nuclear escalation. The exchange underscores a broader worry that Western aid has been incremental and constrained, potentially leaving Ukraine outgunned in a grinding war of attrition despite more advanced but costlier systems.
Glide Bomb Capabilities and Effects
- Main destructive edge is combining large legacy bombs with cheap guidance/glide kits, not just the glide itself.
- Reported range ≈60 km; allows launches from beyond Ukrainian air defenses and even outside Ukrainian airspace.
- Guidance claimed to be accurate to ~10 m, using GLONASS and/or inertial systems; some mention jamming‑resistant modules.
- Debate: some say devastation is due primarily to stand‑off “gliding” defeating air defenses; others stress cheap mass use of large warheads.
Ukrainian Air Defense and Countermeasures
- Patriots can down Russian strike aircraft but must be near the front, making them vulnerable; Russia has already destroyed launchers.
- Some argue more Patriots would let Ukraine accept higher risk near the front; others see fighter jets (e.g., F‑16s) as better counters to bomb‑carrying aircraft.
- UK Dragonfire laser is mentioned but seen as likely underpowered and challenged by tracking small, fast, low‑signature bombs.
Western Aid, Restrictions, and Escalation
- Strong criticism of US/Western conditions forbidding use of supplied weapons on Russian territory; seen as “fighting with one arm tied.”
- Counterview: production limits, interceptor shortages, and nuclear‑escalation risks justify gradual “uncuffing” of Ukraine.
- US domestic politics: aid has passed but with rising opposition, mainly on the political right in one country, raising sustainability concerns.
Guidance, Jamming, and Western Systems
- GPS/GLONASS heavily jammed around Ukraine; some say weapons rely more on inertial navigation, others note many Western systems are GPS‑dependent.
- GLSDB and other GPS‑guided munitions are reportedly underperforming due to jamming.
- Ukraine already has JDAM‑ER and other precision bombs but is limited by aircraft numbers, integration issues, and political targeting constraints.
Why Ukraine Doesn’t Mirror Russia’s City Bombing
- Western stockpiles of old dumb bombs exist, but Ukraine lacks large, survivable air fleets to employ them at scale.
- Ukraine and allies generally avoid deliberate civilian‑area bombardment; Russian use of such tactics is framed as war crimes and possibly genocidal.
- Some argue Ukraine should hit Russian airbases and infrastructure more aggressively; current restrictions partly prevent this.
War Trajectory, Nuclear Risk, and Endgames
- Views range from “Russia likely to bleed Ukraine dry in a war of attrition” to “the only viable outcome is Russian withdrawal.”
- Multiple commenters expect some form of frozen conflict/cease‑fire if neither side can achieve decisive victory.
- Nuclear use is seen by some as very unlikely (citing historical non‑use in tough wars), by others as a non‑trivial catastrophe risk that justifies caution.
Russian Capacity: Economy and Military Adaptation
- One line: Russia is effectively in a mobilized command economy, using “funny money” and large stockpiles; quality/skills constraints loom.
- Counterline: Russian growth figures, resources, low debt/tax, and BRICS efforts suggest resilience and possible long‑term strength; BRICS currency prospects remain disputed.
- On adaptation, some argue Russia was slow, repeatedly making basic mistakes; others emphasize that, despite losses, Russia has learned enough to field effective cheap systems like glide bombs.