Russia's glide bombs devastating Ukraine's cities on the cheap

Glide Bomb Capabilities and Effects

• Main destructive edge is combining large legacy bombs with cheap guidance/glide kits, not just the glide itself.
• Reported range ≈60 km; allows launches from beyond Ukrainian air defenses and even outside Ukrainian airspace.
• Guidance claimed to be accurate to ~10 m, using GLONASS and/or inertial systems; some mention jamming‑resistant modules.
• Debate: some say devastation is due primarily to stand‑off “gliding” defeating air defenses; others stress cheap mass use of large warheads.

Ukrainian Air Defense and Countermeasures

• Patriots can down Russian strike aircraft but must be near the front, making them vulnerable; Russia has already destroyed launchers.
• Some argue more Patriots would let Ukraine accept higher risk near the front; others see fighter jets (e.g., F‑16s) as better counters to bomb‑carrying aircraft.
• UK Dragonfire laser is mentioned but seen as likely underpowered and challenged by tracking small, fast, low‑signature bombs.

Western Aid, Restrictions, and Escalation

• Strong criticism of US/Western conditions forbidding use of supplied weapons on Russian territory; seen as “fighting with one arm tied.”
• Counterview: production limits, interceptor shortages, and nuclear‑escalation risks justify gradual “uncuffing” of Ukraine.
• US domestic politics: aid has passed but with rising opposition, mainly on the political right in one country, raising sustainability concerns.

Guidance, Jamming, and Western Systems

• GPS/GLONASS heavily jammed around Ukraine; some say weapons rely more on inertial navigation, others note many Western systems are GPS‑dependent.
• GLSDB and other GPS‑guided munitions are reportedly underperforming due to jamming.
• Ukraine already has JDAM‑ER and other precision bombs but is limited by aircraft numbers, integration issues, and political targeting constraints.

Why Ukraine Doesn’t Mirror Russia’s City Bombing

• Western stockpiles of old dumb bombs exist, but Ukraine lacks large, survivable air fleets to employ them at scale.
• Ukraine and allies generally avoid deliberate civilian‑area bombardment; Russian use of such tactics is framed as war crimes and possibly genocidal.
• Some argue Ukraine should hit Russian airbases and infrastructure more aggressively; current restrictions partly prevent this.

War Trajectory, Nuclear Risk, and Endgames

• Views range from “Russia likely to bleed Ukraine dry in a war of attrition” to “the only viable outcome is Russian withdrawal.”
• Multiple commenters expect some form of frozen conflict/cease‑fire if neither side can achieve decisive victory.
• Nuclear use is seen by some as very unlikely (citing historical non‑use in tough wars), by others as a non‑trivial catastrophe risk that justifies caution.

Russian Capacity: Economy and Military Adaptation

• One line: Russia is effectively in a mobilized command economy, using “funny money” and large stockpiles; quality/skills constraints loom.
• Counterline: Russian growth figures, resources, low debt/tax, and BRICS efforts suggest resilience and possible long‑term strength; BRICS currency prospects remain disputed.
• On adaptation, some argue Russia was slow, repeatedly making basic mistakes; others emphasize that, despite losses, Russia has learned enough to field effective cheap systems like glide bombs.