Taiwan is behind schedule in preparations to fend off Chinese invasion

US capacity and multi-front conflicts

  • Several comments debate whether the US can credibly deter or fight China while also supporting Ukraine and dealing with Middle East crises.
  • Some argue US industrial and military capacity is far below Cold War levels (e.g., artillery/missile production) and doctrine assumes air superiority that may not hold.
  • Others counter that US submarine and naval power remain a strong deterrent, but note a problematic “middle ground” where responses are half‑hearted and deterrence looks weak.

Taiwan’s defense posture and nuclear question

  • Many are surprised Taiwan never developed a nuclear deterrent; nuclear weapons are seen as the only proven protection for smaller states.
  • Commenters note Taiwan had a covert program decades ago but was pressured by the US (and monitored by China) to dismantle it; current PRC intelligence penetration would likely expose any renewed effort.
  • Some argue China might pre‑emptively strike (even with nukes) to stop Taiwanese nuclearization; others say Beijing wants the territory and population, not a radioactive ruin, so would favor invasion over nuking.

Blockade vs invasion

  • One view: China doesn’t “need” to invade; an air–sea blockade could quickly starve Taiwan, and the island’s density makes it hard to defend.
  • Counterpoint: Taiwan has enough missiles to make a blockade and amphibious assault costly, especially if the US opposes it.
  • Some suggest that if Chinese troops land in force, Taiwan might be better off surrendering than fighting a brutal ground war.

Diplomacy, unification models, and Hong Kong

  • A substantial subthread advocates de‑escalation and a long‑term diplomatic path, including “EU-style” confederal or union arrangements that preserve Taiwanese sovereignty while moving toward some form of “One China.”
  • Others argue this is unrealistic: the CCP would dominate any supranational body, is unlikely to tolerate democracy inside its borders, and has already broken promises in Hong Kong.
  • Hong Kong’s crackdown is repeatedly cited as proof that Beijing’s political guarantees lack credibility; advocates of integration say Taiwan would retain its own military and thus more leverage than Hong Kong had.

US reliability and nuclear proliferation incentives

  • Commenters link Ukraine’s fate to perceptions of US security guarantees. If Ukraine loses, they argue, states like Taiwan and South Korea have stronger incentives to seek their own nukes.
  • Doubts are raised about “strategic ambiguity” and the durability of any secret US promises to defend Taiwan.