NASA acknowledges it cannot quantify risk of Starliner propulsion issues
NASA’s admission that it cannot quantify the risk of propulsion problems on Boeing’s Starliner capsule has intensified concern over two astronauts who remain on the ISS months into what was meant to be an eight‑day test flight. Commenters weigh whether NASA should return the crew on Starliner or shift them to SpaceX’s Crew Dragon, raising issues of safety culture, software reliability, politics, and the agency’s public transparency. Many argue Starliner is now unlikely to ever be certified for routine crew transport, seeing the episode as emblematic of Boeing’s broader engineering and management decline.
Decision Delay & Risk Modeling
- Many wonder why NASA keeps asking for “one more week” after a months‑long delay of an 8‑day mission.
- Explanations offered: more ground hot‑fire tests, detailed modeling of suspected failure modes, and validation of new software/configuration for autonomous operations.
- Some argue that if risk can’t be quantified at this point, crew return on Starliner should be off the table; others say extreme caution and slow decisions are appropriate when lives and the ISS are at stake.
Propulsion Failures & Root Cause Uncertainty
- Leading hypothesis discussed: Teflon valve seals swell at high temperature, restricting propellant, skewing mixture ratios, overheating thrusters, and triggering shutdowns.
- Key unresolved issue: several failed thrusters “recovered,” which doesn’t fit a simple permanent-deformation story, making risk hard to bound.
- Commenters stress that modeling is weak when the underlying mechanism isn’t fully understood.
Software, Autonomy & Undocking Risks
- Starliner’s current onboard software/configuration expects a crew for fault handling; fully autonomous fault‑response near ISS was removed or re‑parameterized since an earlier mission.
- Re‑enabling autonomous fault handling is said to require weeks of work and validation, effectively like a software update.
- Major concern: an uncrewed Starliner with misbehaving thrusters could collide with or damage ISS during undock/exit.
Return Options & ISS Constraints
- Two main paths debated:
- Crew rides Starliner home despite uncertainties.
- Starliner departs empty and is deorbited; astronauts return later on SpaceX Crew Dragon, likely via a reduced‑crew rotation mission bringing extra seats and suits.
- ISS docking ports and scheduling limit parallel vehicles; Starliner must vacate a port before the next Dragon can arrive.
- Supplies on ISS are considered adequate; main constraints are docking space and emergency return capacity for all crew.
NASA vs. Boeing, Politics & Public Trust
- Strong criticism of Boeing’s culture: cost‑cutting, management over engineering, outsourcing, and parallels to 737 MAX failures.
- Others focus frustration on NASA for earlier optimistic messaging and downplaying seriousness while conducting intensive tests, raising calls for an investigation into internal vs. public risk assessments.
- Some speculate election‑year and Musk/SpaceX optics influence decisions; others label that as unproven politicization.
Broader Engineering Lessons
- Recurrent themes: failures often occur at interfaces between contractors and subsystems, inadequate integrated testing, and weak documentation.
- Debate over “agile”/MVP mindsets in safety‑critical systems; several argue that stacking MVPs is incompatible with human‑rated spacecraft and that traditional, rigorous assurance is essential.