Outsourcing Cost Boeing Billions (2019)
Outsourcing critical Boeing 737 MAX software to low‑paid contractors is used as a case study in how aggressive cost cutting and short‑term profit focus can backfire, contributing to both financial losses and fatal safety failures. Commenters debate who bears responsibility—from $9/hour engineers to Boeing management, shareholders, and regulators—and whether the root cause lies in flawed requirements, weak safety culture, or broader “MBA‑driven” capitalism. Many argue that safety‑critical software should be treated as a regulated engineering profession with strong domain expertise and aligned incentives, rather than a cost center to be minimized.
Capitalism, incentives, and safety
- Many argue the root cause is “dumb”/short‑term capitalism: profit and cost‑cutting prioritized over engineering quality and safety.
- Debate over shareholder responsibility: some blame shareholders and the financial system; others note most shareholders have little direct control and blame executives’ short‑term incentives (pay packages, stock price focus).
- Non‑voting shares and “quality‑first” companies are discussed as possible but rare alternatives.
Responsibility for the 737 MAX failures
- Several commenters stress that management decisions, not individual $9/hr developers, killed hundreds of passengers.
- Others say engineers share some responsibility, especially senior ones, for not challenging unsafe requirements, while still emphasizing systemic QA and process failures.
Outsourcing, $9/hr rates, and quality
- Strong skepticism that low‑cost outsourcing saves money in complex, safety‑critical domains; cited downsides: lower quality, accumulated bugs, reputation damage, and misaligned incentives.
- Some note $9/hr can be a good local wage; what’s “shameful” is using very cheap labor for high‑stakes work, not the absolute number.
- Others argue pay is mostly driven by supply/demand; moral judgments about “shameful” pay are contested.
Professionalization and certification
- Multiple comments support professional licensing or certification for safety‑critical software (aviation, space, finance), distinct from casual or low‑risk software.
- Concern that broad “software professionalism” would be overreach; focus should be on high‑impact domains.
MCAS, design vs implementation
- Several say MCAS issues stemmed from system design and requirements (single AOA sensor, optional safety indicators, inadequate training) rather than coding bugs.
- One commenter notes an article stating MCAS itself was not outsourced; the $9/hr engineers reportedly worked on display and test software, making the outsourcing–crash link unclear.
- Others emphasize the deeper cultural shift at the company from “engineering firm” to “run like a business,” with cost and schedule overriding safety.
Offshoring, culture, and communication
- Discussion of offshoring economics: quality engineers in Eastern Europe/India are not as cheap as many assume; top talent is mobile and may not join “cost‑center” roles.
- Cultural and communication gaps, time zones, and lack of domain knowledge are cited as major risks; “the hard part is communication, not typing code.”
- Some responses push back, arguing that even if offshore teams operate at lower effectiveness, the cost savings can still be attractive, though this may not hold in safety‑critical contexts.