F-35 pilot held 50-minute airborne conference call with engineers before crash

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Geopolitics & procurement

  • Several comments argue that buying F‑35s is partly “tribute” to the US: a way for smaller states (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Switzerland) to stay in Washington’s good graces despite tariffs and political pressure.
  • NATO membership is seen as reducing foreign‑policy independence and locking countries into US systems.
  • Some posters suggest others should cancel F‑35 orders since tariffs and leverage exist anyway; others reply that smaller countries don’t have the bargaining power they imagine.

Hydraulic contamination & maintenance

  • The central technical question: how did ~1/3 of the landing‑gear hydraulic fluid become water?
  • Explanations discussed: contaminated ground equipment, open drums left in rain, condensation in tanks, or accidental mixing with another fluid.
  • People note that aviation hydraulic fluids are often fire‑resistant, synthetic ester / phosphate‑ester blends, sometimes hygroscopic, and that in the report, photos of the drum and pump look “confidence‑uninspiring.”
  • Some float “sabotage,” but others counter that water contamination is common and more likely due to poor hazardous‑materials management.

Automation, sensors & control laws

  • Many focus on the weight‑on‑wheels (WoW) sensors causing a switch to “on‑ground” flight law mid‑air, making the jet uncontrollable.
  • Strong criticism that a single sensor class can force a mode that cannot be overridden by the pilot, without sanity checks against airspeed/altitude.
  • Comparisons are made to Airbus and Sukhoi “flight laws,” where degraded or direct‑law modes exist and can sometimes be forced via circuit breakers or switches.
  • Some argue simplicity in flight‑state logic has value; others say cross‑checking multiple sensors is essential, citing other accidents.

Ejection, risk & decision‑making

  • Continuing to troubleshoot for 50 minutes is defended: ejection seats carry ~8–10% historical mortality in some data, frequent spinal injury, and often end a flying career.
  • “Controlled ejection” is interpreted as bailing out from a stable, chosen configuration and location, versus an emergency pull after loss of control.
  • There’s debate over whether the system should offer a “gentler” ejection mode; others argue that complexity and the need to clear the airframe at high speed make this unrealistic.

Cost, insurance & economic framing

  • Discussion over the “$200M” figure: distinction between total acquisition cost and marginal flyaway cost (often quoted under $100M, varying by variant).
  • Consensus that the US government effectively self‑insures; losses fall on taxpayers whether or not contractors are back‑charged.
  • Some liken public attitudes about “insurance paying for it” (in riots or crashes) to a misunderstanding of where the real economic loss lands.

F‑35 capability vs “boondoggle”

  • One side calls the F‑35 an overcomplicated, overpriced “Swiss Army knife” with poor reliability, arguing for simpler, cheaper, specialized aircraft or drones in larger numbers.
  • Others counter that recent combat use (e.g., Israeli strikes) and exercises show it is highly effective and now comparatively cheap per unit versus some 4th‑gen jets.
  • There’s back‑and‑forth over whether its stealth and avionics advantages would hold against a peer adversary, or if earlier “boondoggle” narratives were fueled by propaganda and outdated critiques.

Media coverage vs official report

  • Multiple commenters say the CNN piece is sensationalistic or misleading, especially around implying the pilot was literally “on” a Zoom‑style call.
  • Those who read the accident report note:
    • The pilot initiated the “conference hotel” process;
    • The call ran via a supervisor on a personal phone, with information relayed by radio;
    • The report blames not just “ice” but decision‑making on the call and systemic failures in hazardous‑materials and maintenance procedures.
  • Frustration that mainstream outlets rarely link primary documents, forcing readers to hunt for the PDF themselves.

Remote control, VTOL & design suggestions

  • Some ask why remote piloting isn’t used post‑ejection to attempt a landing; most replies say it’s not helpful in mechanical/control‑law failures and would add huge attack surface and cost for rare edge cases.
  • Confusion arises over VTOL: commenters clarify only the F‑35B has STOVL capability; the USAF’s F‑35A cannot hover or vertically land.
  • Others argue this mishap shows “too much automation” and the need for hard pilot overrides or simpler, more robust designs (with comparisons to A‑10s and older fighters).

Maintenance, “right to repair,” and culture

  • One comment uses this case to question pushing all maintenance to military personnel instead of contractors, noting prior historical examples where manufacturer‑only maintenance reduced failures.
  • Overall, people describe the scenario as a “production outage with life‑and‑death stakes,” contrasting it with everyday software incidents and making dark jokes about Zoom, Jira, and “rebooting” jets.