SpaceX's giant Starship Mars rocket nails critical 10th test flight

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Cost and historical comparisons

  • Long subthread tried to compare Saturn V and Starship development/launch costs; consensus was that any direct comparison is “apples to oranges” due to different eras, tech bases, and precursor programs.
  • Rough numbers cited: Saturn V program ≈ $6.4B then / $33B today, ≈ $185M per launch ($1B today). Starship development estimates cluster around $5–10B so far, with individual test flights guessed at $50–500M.
  • Commenters contrasted this with SLS: ≈$4B per Artemis launch, heavily shaped by politics, shuttle hardware reuse, and “jobs program” constraints that raise per‑launch costs.

Reusability, efficiency, and mission architecture

  • Debate over whether Starship is more cost‑effective than Saturn V:
    • Pro: Raptor and stainless design aimed at low manufacturing cost; full reusability could drop marginal launch cost orders of magnitude below Saturn V/SLS.
    • Con: A lunar mission needs ~10–20 Starship tanker flights; per‑mission cost could rival or exceed Saturn V unless per‑launch cost becomes extremely low.
  • Artemis HLS architecture (Starship lander refueled in LEO, 10–14 tanker flights, Gateway/NRHO) is seen by some as viable but complex; others call it “not happening” and prefer simpler, expendable-style profiles.

Assessment of Flight 10

  • Most participants view Flight 10 as a major success: booster catch attempt, Starship reentry and controlled splashdown, engine relight, and payload “pez dispenser” door all worked.
  • Skeptics note damage: skirt/fin heating, tile loss, an unexplained in‑flight explosion, and water‑induced breakup on splashdown. Supporters counter that these were deliberate “edge of envelope” tests with missing/experimental tiles.
  • Several emphasize that achieving objectives despite substantial damage demonstrates useful robustness for future operations.

Next steps (Flight 11 and beyond)

  • Expectations for Flight 11: repeat Flight 10 profile with fewer intentional compromises, possibly an orbital insertion and deorbit, and increasing focus on booster “chopstick” catches; most think a ship catch and pad return are still a few flights away.
  • Some argue Starship stages are cheap enough to “waste” early in order to map limits; the launch tower and pad are seen as the true long‑lead, high‑risk assets.

Markets, demand, and “Mars rocket” narrative

  • Strong agreement that Starlink is the anchor customer and economic rationale for Starship; one Starship can loft ~20× Falcon 9’s Starlink payload.
  • Disagreement over whether there’s enough non‑Starlink demand to justify Starship’s scale; some see effectively infinite demand if prices reach ~$100–300/kg, others note current markets are thin even at Falcon 9 prices.
  • Labeling Starship as a “Mars rocket” is viewed by some as marketing: technically plausible if refueling, heat shield, and life‑support mature, but there is currently no concrete Mars payload or habitation program.

Broader implications, risks, and politics

  • Some frame Starship as an inflection point: success could drop launch costs by an order of magnitude and enable new industries (large constellations, advanced stations, heavy science payloads); failure could chill fully reusable launcher efforts for years.
  • Kessler Syndrome and space debris fears are raised; others argue low‑orbit lifetimes and cheap access would enable cleanup and replacement.
  • Several wrestle with celebrating SpaceX’s engineering while disliking its founder’s politics and behavior; others argue for compartmentalizing and crediting the broader engineering teams.
  • Comparisons with Blue Origin highlight execution speed: founded earlier, New Glenn is only just reaching orbit, whereas SpaceX has high‑cadence Falcon 9 and now advancing Starship.