How the UK lost its shipbuilding industry

Strategic industry vs buying from “friends”

• One camp argues shipbuilding (and related heavy industry, refining, etc.) is inherently strategic for an island nation; you should accept higher costs as defence spending to preserve sovereignty and crisis flexibility.
• Others respond that no country can be self‑sufficient in all “critical” goods; relying on close allies’ capacity (e.g. South Korea) plus diversified supply is more realistic, especially for smaller states.
• Several point out “friends” can change (US–Canada, Russia–Ukraine, Taiwan’s situation), so over‑reliance on any one foreign supplier is a risk that must be priced in.

Nukes, navies, and modern conflict

• Some claim nuclear deterrence makes large navies and domestic shipbuilding marginal for nuclear powers: any blockade/invasion would invite nuclear escalation.
• Many disagree: nuclear weapons are almost unusable except in existential scenarios; most real conflicts are conventional, proxy, or limited (Ukraine, India–Pakistan, Yom Kippur).
• There’s debate over whether modern ships are too vulnerable to missiles and drones, vs still essential for power projection and protecting sea lanes.

Autarky, comparative advantage, and resilience

• Free‑trade advocates stress comparative advantage: forcing shipbuilding at home diverts capital and labour from higher‑value activities and leaves you poorer yet still dependent on imported inputs.
• Critics counter that pure efficiency ignores resilience and politics: in crises, suppliers hoard or weaponise exports (pandemic supplies, rare earths, fuel, AdBlue); redundancy and local capacity can be cheaper once these risks are fully costed.
• Several note that moving “down the stack” (e.g. steel, engines, ores) quickly balloons the scope of “strategic” industries.

Unions, management, and political choices

• One narrative blames militant unions and restrictive demarcation rules for blocking modernisation and killing productivity; management in some sectors eventually automated or offshored to escape.
• Others argue unions were a symptom, not the root cause: British management quality was poor, capital investment was scarce, and the governing class culturally disdained “trade.”
• Thatcher‑era policy is seen by some as simply turning off life support for already‑uncompetitive industries; by others as ideologically driven deindustrialisation that went far beyond what economics required.

Loss of capability and the restart problem

• Commenters highlight how once industries like shipbuilding or nuclear construction atrophy, institutional knowledge disappears; later attempts (e.g. ferries in Scotland, EPR reactors, AP1000) are late and over budget.
• Sporadic prestige projects without continuous pipelines don’t rebuild competence; you need sustained volume and skills transfer, not one‑off bailouts.

Global shipbuilding economics and Asia’s rise

• Multiple comments emphasise that labour cost is a small share of ship cost; Asia’s dominance came from state‑backed finance, export credits, and large, standardised yards in Japan, Korea, then China.
• Civilian ship assembly is described as a low‑margin, scale‑driven business; a plausible “middle path” is focusing on higher‑value components and military vessels rather than trying to match Asian bulk output.
• Some note Italy, Germany and others still hold niches (cruise ships, complex systems), challenging a simple “all heavy industry is gone from Europe” story.

UK’s broader economic model and decline anxieties

• Many see shipbuilding’s collapse as one facet of wider UK deindustrialisation: loss of cars, steel, and other sectors; over‑reliance on finance, property, and services; weak investment and productivity.
• There is sharp criticism of short‑term political horizons, the dominance of London finance (“Dutch disease”), and an education‑and‑class system that channels talent away from engineering into elite professions.
• Others push back on “failed state” rhetoric, pointing to UK strengths in research, creative industries, advanced manufacturing niches and services, while conceding regional decay and poor infrastructure.

Democracy, class, and who sets priorities

• A recurrent thread questions whether elites have “skin in the game”: they can exit crises, benefit from offshoring, and face few consequences for long‑term decay.
• Some argue the electorate itself repeatedly chooses parties and systems (FPTP, weak referendums, limited proportionality) that entrench a narrow establishment and hinder long‑term industrial strategy.
• Suggestions include deeper European integration, electoral reform, more direct democracy, or explicit industrial policy; others are sceptical any of this will emerge from current political incentives.