Can someone please explain whether Cloudflare blackmailed Canonical?
Cloudflare’s role in a major DDoS attack against Ubuntu infrastructure has prompted accusations that the company effectively runs a “protection racket,” by providing free front-end services to alleged DDoS-for-hire operators while selling mitigation to their targets. Commenters argue over whether this constitutes blackmail or simply a side effect of Cloudflare’s content‑neutral, low‑friction signup model, with some highlighting conflicts of interest and poor abuse handling, and others stressing that only courts—not infrastructure providers—should decide what is taken offline. Many note that there is no clear public evidence tying Cloudflare infrastructure directly to the attack itself, and that demanding stricter vetting or takedowns risks expanding corporate control over what remains accessible on the internet.
Was Cloudflare “blackmailing” Canonical?
- Many commenters say “blackmail”/“extortion” is the wrong framing.
- Cloudflare did not threaten Canonical; it sold DDoS protection while also providing (free) services to an alleged DDoS-for-hire outfit.
- Critics call this a “protection racket” in effect: attackers get free protection, victims must pay for defense. Defenders say this is just market reality, not collusion.
Cloudflare’s role hosting DDoS‑for‑hire sites
- The attackers’ site uses Cloudflare for its marketing/login front end, but there’s no evidence in the thread that Cloudflare infrastructure carried the actual attack traffic.
- Some argue Cloudflare’s easy, anonymous, free DDoS protection enabled the modern DDoS ecosystem and lets “booters” safely advertise.
- Others counter that such services would exist anyway on other hosts (GitHub Pages, Telegram, Tor, etc.).
Legal obligations, abuse handling, and liability
- Several people stress Cloudflare has no obligation to share customer data without subpoenas or court orders.
- Some report poor experiences with Cloudflare abuse handling, especially for scams and phishing; others report fast and effective takedowns for clearly illegal content.
- Debate over whether infrastructure providers should bear more liability for enabling attacks or scams, versus relying on traditional law enforcement.
Content neutrality vs content policing
- One camp insists Cloudflare should host any legal site until forced by lawful order; otherwise Cloudflare becomes a chokepoint “content police.”
- Another camp says services explicitly selling DDoS-for-hire cross a line and should be dropped under Cloudflare’s own ToS about illegal/harmful use.
- There is concern that stricter vetting (KYC-style) would destroy anonymity and raise barriers for small users.
Systemic incentives and alternatives
- Some see DDoS protection as an inherently perverse “protection racket” born from protocol weaknesses and cheap VPS/residential proxies.
- Proposed alternatives include government/nonprofit DDoS protection or cooperatives, but feasibility is questioned.
- There’s side discussion that the Ubuntu outage may have been timed to slow patching of a recent kernel exploit; details remain speculative.
Unclear / disputed points
- Whether the specific Beamed site actually orchestrated the Ubuntu attack is disputed; the article relies on unverified online claims.
- The extent of Cloudflare’s responsibility or moral culpability remains sharply contested.