RPKI now protects 70% of internet routes
Route Origin Validation via RPKI now secures roughly 70% of global internet routes, prompting debate over how much centralized control over routing should be tolerated in the name of stability and security. Commenters weigh the benefits of preventing BGP hijacks and accidental outages against the risk that governments could pressure registries to de‑route entire countries, accelerating the “splinternet.” Others note that similar leverage already exists through IP address allocation and peering policies, arguing that any fragmentation would ultimately be a political choice rather than a purely technical one.
RPKI, Centralization, and Geopolitics
- Major concern: centralizing route authorization (e.g., RPKI databases in a single country) gives that jurisdiction leverage to cut off another country’s internet.
- Some argue this is an unacceptable concentration of power; others say states already have legal authority over ISPs and international law is necessary anyway.
- Several note that similar leverage already exists via IP/DNS roots; it’s mostly not used to avoid creating a long‑term “splinternet.”
- View that if a government abused RPKI, operators could disable validation or adopt alternative trust anchors, limiting damage.
Decentralization vs Regulation
- One side emphasizes the original vision of a politically neutral, decentralized internet, skeptical of any centralization at the IP layer.
- Others respond that the internet is already a network of legally constrained networks; true “stateless” decentralization (sneakernet, mesh, p2p) is different from today’s ISP‑based reality.
Country-Level Blocking and “Splinternet” Risks
- Many operators reportedly block foreign countries to reduce attacks as part of “zero trust”; claimed to be cheap and effective against low‑effort abuse.
- Critics argue it’s largely defeated by VPNs, may embed xenophobia, and creates asymmetries (e.g., non‑US sites being blocked while relying on US crawlers).
- National‑scale blocking of Russia/China is seen as technically feasible but economically and socially disruptive due to trade, communications, and infrastructure dependencies.
Operational Use and Alternatives
- RPKI is seen as just one tool: governments could also push de‑peering, BGP attacks, or even IP space reassignment to disrupt connectivity.
- Newer mechanisms like ASPA for AS‑path validation are emerging but still have low coverage.
Data, Tools, and Adoption Drivers
- IP‑to‑country and ASN data are available via services like IPinfo; anycast handling is called out.
- WHOIS is being replaced by RDAP; each RIR offers its own lookup.
- A Dutch “internet quality” tester that rewards RPKI with a perfect score is cited as a strong practical driver for adoption.
Reactions to the Article and AI-Generated Prose
- Some readers strongly dislike the article’s “LLM‑like” style and verbosity, calling it “slop.”
- Others say they’re fine with obviously AI‑generated docs if they’re honest about it.
- The publisher explains the difficulty of turning large datasets into approachable stories and describes a strategy of pairing narrative posts with interactive dashboards.
Broader Political Context
- Tangential debate on sanctions, invasions, and whether cutting off a country like Russia would be justified.
- Extended side thread on foreign influence, social media amplification, globalization/capitalism, and how economic distress fuels susceptibility to propaganda.