France needs to read my paper
Advocates of a land value tax (LVT) argue it could curb rent‑seeking, reduce housing scarcity in desirable cities, and replace more distortionary taxes, with references to partial implementations in places like Singapore, Denmark, Estonia, and Taiwan. Critics counter that valuing land fairly is complex, that LVT risks pricing cash‑poor homeowners and elderly residents out of their neighborhoods, and that any major new tax is politically toxic in already highly taxed countries such as France. The exchange widens to related ideas like UBI, vice taxes, and anti‑monopoly measures, underscoring how deeply disagreements over fairness, state power, and economic priorities shape proposals for reform.
Land Value Tax (LVT): Core Arguments
- Proponents see LVT as:
- Taxing “bad capitalism” / economic rents rather than productive activity.
- Highly efficient: low deadweight loss, minimal distortion of development choices.
- Better than inheritance and conventional property taxes; can replace many other taxes.
- Supporters argue land value mostly comes from nature and surrounding society, not the individual owner, so capturing that value is fair.
- Critics say:
- LVT effectively forces owners toward profit-maximizing uses and reduces liberty.
- It blurs into de facto state ownership and “turns landowners into renters from the government.”
- It may accelerate concentration of land in corporate hands and harm local communities.
Housing, Development, and the “Grandma Problem”
- Advocates say LVT discourages land banking and vacancy, improves housing supply, and suppresses rent growth.
- Skeptics worry about:
- Elderly or cash-poor owners in gentrified or high-value areas being taxed out of long-time homes (“grandma collateral”).
- Proposed mitigations: exemptions or caps for primary residences, reverse mortgages funded/structured around the LVT.
Examples and Feasibility
- Cited partial or analogous implementations: Singapore’s state land leases, Denmark (grundskyld), Estonia (taxing land only), Taiwan, some Pennsylvania towns, UK’s short‑lived 1909 experiment.
- Practical concerns:
- Valuation complexity and cost; potential for gaming and appeals.
- Politically toxic where homeownership has been idealized for decades.
Alternatives and Variants
- Suggestions include:
- Vacancy / unused-property taxes instead of pure LVT.
- Taxes on “inefficient” use of land vs. zoning potential (criticized as democratically fragile).
- Stronger vice taxes (gambling, drugs, predatory apps, luxury goods), though others note regressive effects and black markets.
- Some argue core housing issues stem more from urban centralization, monopolistic dynamics, and zoning than from land tax design alone.
UBI, Scarcity, and Rent-Seeking
- Mixed views on UBI:
- Some doubt it will boost political engagement; point to long-term benefit recipients who did not become more active.
- Others note time and money are both preconditions for engagement but worry about a “have vs. can‑survive” divide.
- Concerns that UBI would be capitalized into higher land values and resource prices, weakening its impact.
France, Politics, and “Simple Solutions”
- Several comments argue France’s problem is not lack of economic ideas but political fragmentation, high public expenditure, and entrenched interests.
- Some call for less tax and spending; others reject austerity and demand heavier taxation of the rich and rentiers.
- There is broad skepticism toward claims that LVT + UBI (or any single reform) is a “simple” solution to complex societal problems.