Police chief unplugs cameras after Flock ignores contract cancellation
A U.S. city’s attempt to cancel its contract with Flock Safety, an automated license plate reader (ALPR) vendor, has raised alarms after the company allegedly ignored the termination and even continued operating or replacing cameras. Commenters debate the legality and ethics of a private surveillance network on public infrastructure, compare Flock’s dragnet-style tracking to consumer systems like Ring, and question corporate accountability when firms appear more responsive to federal or law‑enforcement interests than to local democratic decisions. Many see the episode as part of a broader trend toward normalized mass surveillance and weakened public control over how data about citizens is collected and shared.
Contract, Legality, and Public Infrastructure
- Many ask how Flock can legally keep operating or reinstalling cameras after a contract is canceled, suggesting “theft of service,” trespass, or fines per device/day.
- Others note the article doesn’t show the contract terms; cancellation may mean “no renewal” at end of term, with a required notice period, so immediate removal might not be contractually mandated.
- A week between mailed notice and action is seen by some as ample time; others argue it’s unreasonable to expect a full legal response so fast.
- There’s debate over whether “unplugging” is literal, since many cameras are solar/battery-powered; even without grid power, their presence still uses public right-of-way and creates liability.
Surveillance, Privacy, and Comparison to Ring
- Strong concern that Flock enables mass, cross-jurisdiction ALPR-based surveillance and “dragnet” searches, including “pre‑crime” style pattern analysis.
- Some distinguish Flock from consumer devices like Ring: public vs private property, default data access for law enforcement, systemic dragnet vs event-based access.
- Others argue Ring and similar cloud cameras are also de facto surveillance infrastructure with weak user control, police partnerships, and history of warrantless or opaque sharing.
- Several comments frame both as points on a spectrum: Ring can be harmful to privacy, but Flock is viewed as more extreme in empowering the state.
Police, Politics, and Civic Engagement
- Thread highlights that local civic pressure led to contract cancellations; some see this as evidence citizens are engaged.
- Others are deeply cynical about electoral politics, two-party “duopoly,” and law-and-order campaigns that make tools like Flock politically attractive.
- There is discussion of sheriffs vs city chiefs (elected vs appointed) and whether police will see Flock as an ally (more arrests, warrants) or liability (false positives, lawsuits, budget drain).
Corporate Power, “Pseudo-Government,” and Funding
- Multiple comments compare Flock’s behavior to other tech firms (e.g., Uber) that ignore regulation until forced.
- Some claim laws effectively don’t apply to big corporations and billionaires, pointing to rare prosecutions as exceptions driven by harm to powerful investors.
- A recurring theme is that Flock behaves like a government surveillance program fronted by a private company: cameras installed “on spec,” reliance on federal grants, and alleged broad data sharing beyond what local officials think they agreed to.
Countermeasures, Resistance, and Brand Toxicity
- People discuss low-tech ways to disable devices (bags, shower caps, spray paint) or feed them misleading imagery, and note that citizens have already smashed or removed cameras in some places.
- Some advocate only non-destructive civil disobedience; others escalate rhetorically toward violent retribution against executives, which is not endorsed but clearly reflects anger.
- Flock’s brand is widely described as “toxic,” with municipalities allegedly racing to disassociate; some see this as the natural result of perceived arrogance and disregard for local decisions.
Legal Recourse and Data Protection
- Suggestions include using trespass and even RICO (met with skepticism) against the company and its leadership.
- Small-claims strategies are questioned: recording a plate alone may not show concrete harm or standing in US courts.
- References are made to GDPR, UK domestic CCTV rules, and state privacy laws, but commenters note US enforcement typically requires demonstrable harm and is often limited to state attorneys general.