So my ISP was hijacking my DNS

ISPs in several countries are intercepting or rewriting DNS queries, sometimes to comply with censorship laws and sometimes to inject ads or redirect failed lookups, which users experience as broken services, odd redirects, or high latency. Commenters weigh technical countermeasures such as DNSSEC, DNS-over-HTTPS/TLS, local resolvers, VPNs, and split-DNS setups, noting that each mitigates only parts of the problem and often shifts trust to another intermediary. There is broad concern about the normalization of such interference, with some arguing that legal and political safeguards are as important as technical ones.

Prevalence and Nature of DNS Tampering

  • Multiple commenters report ISPs and mobile carriers intercepting or rewriting DNS, including:
    • Blocking specific resolvers (e.g., Quad9) due to legal mandates.
    • Forcing use of ISP DNS and hijacking UDP/53 to internal resolvers.
    • Modifying NXDOMAIN responses into ad/search pages.
  • Some say only a minority of ISPs do active tampering of third‑party DNS, others say in some countries it’s “pretty much most ISPs,” especially for torrent or “piracy” sites.

Reasons ISPs Interfere with DNS

  • Legally mandated blocking (copyright, child protection, censorship, age-gating).
  • Commercial motives:
    • Ad injection via NXDOMAIN hijacking or HTTP content rewriting.
    • Traffic steering to caches (e.g., video/CDN optimization).
  • Some ISP operators in the thread claim they do not want to do this because it’s costly and unpopular, but acknowledge others do, and some even support more regulation.

Technical Defenses and Home Setups

  • Common suggestions:
    • Use DoH/DoT to trusted resolvers; sometimes combined with blocking raw port 53.
    • Run local validating resolvers (e.g., unbound) and/or Pi-hole as DNS/DHCP to override ISP settings.
    • Insert an extra router you control and ignore the ISP router’s DHCP.
  • Caveats:
    • Some ISPs still hijack all port 53 traffic.
    • Using remote resolvers can break locality-based routing (CDN performance).
    • Root servers are not expected to offer DoH/DoT; separation of roots and caches is intentional.

DNSSEC: Utility, Problems, and UX

  • Debate over DNSSEC:
    • Critics: original design assumes validation on servers, not clients; low adoption at second level; misconfigurations cause obscure failures; some privacy downsides (zone enumeration).
    • Supporters: currently the only mechanism to cryptographically validate DNS data; useful for things like SSHFP and ACME; worth enabling until something better exists.
  • Many argue DNSSEC failures should be “loud” with clear security warnings, not silent breakage, and validation should be as close to the client as possible.

VPNs and Threat Tradeoffs

  • Suggested as protection against local ISP tampering, especially if you run your own endpoint on a VPS.
  • Counterpoint: this just moves trust from ISP to VPN or hosting provider; public VPN marketing is viewed with suspicion.
  • IPv4/HTTPS inspection concerns raised, but consensus is that breaking modern VPN/TLS implies a much stronger adversary.

Workplace and Institutional Networks

  • Reports of universities and workplaces using DNS for filtering, sometimes causing latency and resolution failures.
  • Some users bypass this with DoH, noting smoother browsing, while others warn this can violate policy and be grounds for discipline depending on environment.