We know 15k websites are infected. how do we tell them?
A security researcher has identified over 15,000 websites serving malicious JavaScript and is struggling with how to alert their owners without creating a public hit list for attackers or triggering accusations of extortion or spam. Commenters weigh options such as emailing site contacts, using WHOIS and abuse@ addresses, working through hosting providers, CERTs, or browser blocklists like Google Safe Browsing, and even building a “have I been pwned”–style lookup service. The exchange highlights a broader tension between responsible disclosure and rapidly protecting users, as well as systemic problems with third‑party scripts, weak contact practices, and hard‑to-escape blocklists.
Core problem
- Large set (~15k) of sites are serving malicious JS, often via third‑party “supply chain” scripts.
- Main question: how to alert site owners at scale without causing new harms (e.g., target lists, permanent blocklisting, accusations of hacking).
Direct notification approaches
- Traditional method: WHOIS contacts; many say still viable via registrar relay or abuse contacts, despite GDPR and privacy guards.
- Others suggest:
- Standard addresses (abuse@, webmaster@, admin@, info@).
- Scraping contact pages (contact, impressum, etc.).
- Automating email sending over time to avoid looking like spam.
- Skepticism:
- Many addresses dead or unmonitored.
- Messages can be ignored as scams given high volume of fake “security reports”.
Reporting to intermediaries (hosts, CDNs, CERT, authorities)
- Proposals to:
- Notify major hosting providers, CDNs (e.g., via abuse portals), and they cascade to customers or suspend sites.
- Contact browser vendors / Google Safe Browsing and similar services.
- Use national CERTs, law enforcement, or EU data‑breach channels; possibly group by country.
- Concern: can lead to heavy‑handed takedowns of small sites without context.
Publishing a public list
- One camp: publish all affected domains (similar to “have I been pwned”); owners can self‑check; protects users immediately; silence is seen as unethical.
- Others warn:
- It becomes a ready‑made target list for attackers.
- Once domains land on many blocklists, removal is slow or impossible, devastating for small businesses.
- Middle‑ground ideas:
- A “checker” site where owners can prove domain control (DNS/.well‑known) and retrieve details.
- Limited publication for uncontactable or clearly abandoned sites.
Browser/search blocklists and user protection
- Many argue user protection is primary: report sites to Safe Browsing et al. so users see red warnings.
- Counterpoints:
- Getting unblocked after fixing is inconsistent and painful.
- But others share experiences where delisting was possible within hours after remediation.
Responsible disclosure vs urgency
- Some say “responsible disclosure” framing fits poorly: these sites are already actively compromised, not merely vulnerable.
- Analogy: more like seeing credit‑card skimmers installed; you escalate fast rather than quietly emailing.
- Yet, there’s sympathy for not instantly nuking responsive, well‑meaning admins.
Structural issues with third‑party JS & web security
- Strong criticism of third‑party analytics/ads/heatmaps: huge attack surface, weak CSP practices, and opaque, dynamic scripts.
- Suggestions:
- Host static, hashed third‑party JS on same origin.
- Use versioned, immutable scripts; no runtime script injection.
- Recognize that current practices benefit large ad/analytics ecosystems at cost of speed and safety.
Operational and legal obstacles
- Mass contact risks:
- Being flagged as spammer.
- Misinterpretation as extortion if payment is requested.
- Potential legal threats for “hacking” even when only observing.
- Some argue the ethical duty is limited: owners are ultimately responsible; beyond a reasonable notification attempt, do nothing more.
Miscellaneous suggestions and reflections
- Ideas: crowdsourcing contact discovery; AI/agents to find emails; scanning uploads for malware (old BBS practice); using script‑blocking extensions (NoScript) as end‑user mitigation.
- Some lament that average users now see malware‑ridden, ad‑heavy experiences as “normal,” making the broader web feel “lost” or irredeemably degraded.