Apparent sequence and severity of the accident
- Multiple videos show the left (No. 1) engine area engulfed in flames during the takeoff roll, with a large ground fire trail and extensive industrial damage.
- Several commenters note stills showing the entire left engine later found beside the runway, suggesting engine separation, and possible damage to the tail (No. 2) engine from debris.
- The aircraft was heavily fueled for a long Louisville–Honolulu cargo flight; estimates in the thread range from tens of thousands of gallons/pounds up to ~200–250k gallons mentioned in early dispatch notes, contributing to the huge fire. (Exact quantity remains unclear.)
V1, engine-out performance, and pilot decision-making
- Many comments explain that multi‑engine airliners must be able to safely continue takeoff if a single engine fails at or after V1; aborts above V1 are generally prohibited because there isn’t enough runway to stop.
- MD‑11s are designed to fly on two of three engines, but commenters stress that “engine failure” vs. “engine detaches and shreds the wing/damages another engine/hydraulics” are completely different problems.
- There is disagreement over whether the crew made a conscious “heroic” choice to protect people on the ground versus simply following standard V1 procedures with incomplete information and almost no time. Multiple posters urge waiting for NTSB data before attributing intent or blame.
Damage mechanisms and comparisons to past accidents
- Several posts compare this event to American Airlines 191 and El Al 1862: engine/pylon separation, wing leading‑edge damage, slat/hydraulic issues and asymmetric lift leading to uncontrollable roll.
- Some suspect an uncontained engine failure or structural/pylon issue; others mention a pre‑flight delay reportedly for left‑engine work, but later note an NTSB briefing stating no immediate pre‑departure maintenance is known—this remains unresolved in the thread.
Cameras, sensors, and cockpit information load
- Long sub‑thread on whether external cameras (tail/wing views) should be standard to let pilots visually confirm damage.
- Pro‑camera side: could clarify situations like severe engine damage, wing deformation, gear status, or fuel leaks, avoiding reliance on cabin crew or fly‑bys.
- Skeptical side: during takeoff emergencies pilots are already at cognitive limits; extra video feeds risk information overload, and current fire/fault detection systems are designed to trigger simple, unambiguous alerts (“ENG FIRE/FAIL”) rather than describe exact failure modes.
Runway overruns, barriers, and EMAS
- Question raised: why no barriers between runway ends and “important” infrastructure.
- Responses explain:
- The kinetic energy of a fully loaded widebody at takeoff speed is enormous; solid barriers would be unsurvivable.
- Engineered materials arrestor systems (EMAS) exist and are effective for landing overruns at lower speeds, but are not designed for high‑speed rejected takeoffs.
- Any “extra” land at runway ends is already treated as safety margin; designing to routinely use that margin is discouraged.
Airport siting, land use, and noise/safety buffers
- Many comments note how “lucky” it was that the jet came down in a relatively sparse industrial zone rather than the nearby downtown or residential areas.
- Discussion of zoning practice: guidance usually discourages dense residential/commercial development off runway ends, but many legacy airports (Midway, San Diego, Love Field, etc.) are now tightly surrounded by housing and schools due to urban growth and political pressure.
- Some describe past buyouts and demolition of neighborhoods near Louisville’s UPS hub under the banner of “noise/safety,” later replaced by warehouses—leading to cynicism about mixed motives, though this crash is cited as grim validation of the underlying safety logic.
Maintenance practices, MD‑11 age, and outsourcing debates
- MD‑11 production ended in 2000; current fleets are elderly, mostly ex‑passenger airframes converted to freighters. Commenters note cargo aircraft often fly fewer daily cycles, but conversions and age increase complexity.
- Speculation ranges from maintenance error (including historical concerns about forklift engine handling in DC‑10/MD‑11 pylons) to manufacturing defects or foreign repair practices; several people link to pieces on outsourced maintenance and foreign repair stations.
- Others, including people with maintenance experience, push back hard: foreign MROs typically undergo rigorous FAA/EASA oversight; blaming “foreign work” without evidence is called out as uninformed.
- Multiple posters emphasize that early “it must be maintenance” claims are premature and the NTSB’s independent investigation will determine cause.
Aviation safety, regulation, and institutional roles
- Broader discussion on how extraordinarily safe modern commercial aviation is, despite occasional catastrophes.
- Some argue for stronger regulation and against cost‑cutting “race to the bottom”; others note that deregulation and intense competition coexist with historically low accident rates.
- There’s praise for the NTSB’s structure and culture: separated from the FAA, methodical, reluctant to speculate, and focused on system fixes rather than individual blame.
Emotional reactions and personal context
- Many express horror at the ground devastation and sympathy for the crew and affected workers; several relate past local crashes hitting neighborhoods and how that shapes their perception of risk.
- A story appears of a UPS pilot whose first day was supposed to be on this flight but was removed from the roster, underlining the role of chance.