Everything will be alright in Iceland

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Living with volcanoes, harsh weather and relative isolation has helped shape an Icelandic ethos summed up by the phrase “þetta reddast” – roughly, “it’ll work out” – that combines pragmatism, communal responsibility and a high tolerance for risk and uncertainty. Commenters contrast this mindset with cultures that either over‑optimize safety or avoid confronting problems, and note how similar “it’ll be fine” attitudes appear in places like Ireland, New Zealand and Australia with mixed results for infrastructure and governance. Iceland’s late but rapid modernization, strong welfare state and high median wealth are cited as factors that make this relaxed fatalism sustainable, even as tourism growth and outdoor mishaps expose its limits.

Icelandic mentality and “þetta reddast”

  • Commenters describe “þetta reddast” as a mix of “it’ll work out,” “don’t feel like dealing with this,” and “fuck it”; often used jokingly when things suck.
  • Some see it as born of necessity: historically poor, harsh environment, frequent natural threats.
  • Related Icelandic verb “nenna” (“can’t be bothered”) is a socially acceptable way to decline doing things.
  • One commenter notes personally adopting a similar attitude by realizing past “disasters” never had the dire consequences feared.

Landscape, volcanism, and daily life

  • Icelanders are portrayed as unusually comfortable near active volcanism: hot-spring-fed public baths, living on volcano slopes, sulfur-smelling hot water.
  • Terrain is described as vegetatively sparse, rocky, and often nearly impassable, with a thin “crust” of life over lava.
  • Historically, forests once covered a quarter to two-fifths of the island; Viking deforestation and lava fields left it bare, and there are current reforestation efforts.
  • Examples of creative adaptation: remote sheep farming supported by aircraft before roads.

Wealth, infrastructure, and inequality

  • Iceland industrialized late and only ceased being a colony in 1918; by the 1950s much of the basic infrastructure caught up, except roads and rail (none today).
  • Clarification that the “running water at moon landing” remark referred mainly to hot-water district heating, not total lack of plumbing.
  • Comparisons show the US also lacked complete plumbing into the 1970s.
  • Today Iceland ranks among the world’s richest per adult, with very high median wealth and a large share of “millionaires,” driven in part by housing appreciation and historic inflation that wiped out older fixed-rate mortgages.
  • Several emphasize relatively low destitution and a compressed wealth distribution.

Tourism, safety culture, and rescue

  • Tourists’ risky behavior (e.g., roping up on glaciers without proper training) worries Icelandic search-and-rescue volunteers.
  • Some rescuers stress the difference between measured risk with preparation and ignorant gambles that endanger others.
  • Iceland is noted for minimal warning signage or railings around geysers, cliffs, and rough roads; locals appear to assume common sense around ubiquitous hazards.

Global “it’ll be fine” cultures and risk perception

  • Parallels drawn to Ireland’s “it’ll be grand,” Australia/New Zealand’s “she’ll be right,” Turkish phrases wishing luck or resignation, and attitudes in Pakistan and the Philippines.
  • Some see these mindsets as resilience; others argue they enable chronic dysfunction (e.g., New Zealand’s “she’ll be right” linked to tolerance of failing infrastructure).
  • Contrast made with stereotyped German/Dutch style of “this is bad, it must be fixed,” which some prefer for effectiveness.
  • Several criticize US risk perception as badly miscalibrated: over-fearing rare threats while suppressing healthy, free-range experiences for children.

Space spending, welfare, and war (thread drift)

  • A large sub-thread debates whether Apollo reflected misplaced priorities compared to civil rights and social programs.
  • One side argues Apollo symbolized neglect of marginalized communities; the other lists extensive 1960s US welfare and civil-rights legislation as evidence the state did “more than one thing at a time.”
  • Another tangent compares the relatively modest, productive cost of Apollo to the vastly higher, destructive costs of wars like Vietnam and Iraq; several argue war spending is the true extravagance.
  • Further debate covers the modern SLS program vs. private rockets, dependence on a single private company, and national security concerns.

Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and intervention

  • Extended arguments over whether US interventions in Vietnam and later Afghanistan were justified or winnable.
  • One view: strong anti-communist or hegemonic interests made these wars necessary, and better execution or political resolve might have led to South Korea–style outcomes.
  • Counterview: these were fundamentally unwinnable attempts to dominate motivated local populations; costs in money and lives were enormous, and outcomes (communist Vietnam, Taliban Afghanistan) likely inevitable.
  • Disagreement over US responsibility for, or ability to prevent, atrocities like Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge genocide; some claim consistent intervention could have stopped it, others note US/Chinese support for the regime and Vietnam’s eventual role in ending the genocide.
  • Afghanistan withdrawal is likewise contested: some see a minimal, sustainable presence abandoned for political reasons; others cite internal documents (Afghanistan Papers) indicating systemic corruption, unsustainable local casualties, and an unwinnable war.