What a major solar storm could do
A major solar storm on the scale of the 1859 Carrington Event could induce powerful currents in long conductors, damaging high‑voltage transformers, undersea cables, and GPS-reliant infrastructure, with cascading effects on power, communications, and critical services. Commenters debate how feasible it is to harden the grid with fast protection systems or preemptive shutdowns, noting both technical mitigation strategies and regulatory, economic, and political barriers that make large-scale preparedness unlikely. The thread also connects this risk to broader questions of disaster planning, from stockpiles and local resilience to how societies handle low-probability, high-impact events.
Grid vulnerability and transformers
- Core technical concern: rapid geomagnetic field changes from a CME induce large quasi‑DC currents in very long conductors (power lines, pipelines, undersea cables).
- Biggest risk: damage to large backbone transformers, especially if not protected by fast ground‑fault interruption / specialized relays. Replacement lead times are months; no large stockpiles exist.
- Some argue modern grids and lightning protection make us “mostly prepared”; others reply lightning is brief and localized, whereas geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) can be large, sustained, and heat equipment and even grounding systems.
- Debate over whether standard fast grounding/transformer designs are sufficient; several commenters think the grid is older and less hardened than many assume.
Feasibility of pre-emptive shutdown
- CMEs travel much slower than light; examples cited of 15–24 hours warning between flare observation and impact.
- Some say we can trip large parts of the grid in seconds if operators decide to, and procedures for geomagnetic disturbances exist.
- Others question the real-world decision chain, coordination, and political will, and note shutdowns themselves cause deaths and disruption.
- There is concern that “turning off electricity” is not enough unless transformers are fully isolated from induced currents.
Other infrastructure at risk
- Undersea internet cables: repeaters with long conductors in conductive seawater could see currents far above ratings; power‑off may not fully protect them, though global connectivity likely survives in some form.
- Satellites face deep charging and sparking; usually seen as secondary to grid risk.
- GPS dependence is flagged as a major systemic vulnerability for timing and positioning in telecoms, finance, industrial systems, even stationary equipment.
Preparedness, incentives, and governance
- Many see grid hardening and transformer stockpiles as technically straightforward but blocked by short‑term financial incentives, regulatory constraints, and “ratepayer vs taxpayer” debates.
- Some advocate national‑level, centrally managed resilience: food and medicine stockpiles, local manufacturing capacity, robust devices, community training.
- Others focus on personal/community preparedness (2‑week supplies, mutual aid), noting a Carrington‑scale event would be global, so outside “cavalry” may not come quickly.
Related risks and side topics
- Comparisons to rare but documented events: Carrington, Miyake events (much larger inferred storms), Tunguska, major earthquakes (Cascadia, New Madrid), megafloods.
- Some light speculation: AGI either saved by or saving us from such events; opportunistic military or terrorist actions during a solar‑storm blackout.
- Meta-discussion on New Yorker style: complaints about biographical, long‑form narrative vs desire for concise technical explanations.