U.S. seeks to revive idled shipyards with help of Japan, South Korea

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Efforts to revive U.S. shipbuilding are seen as constrained less by lack of ideas and more by capital intensity, materials, skilled labor, and entrenched industrial and legal frameworks such as the Jones Act. Commenters argue that large naval and commercial shipyards aren’t realistically “disruptible” by startups in the way software or even rockets have been, and that rebuilding capacity will likely require long-term public–private investment, sectoral unions, and strategic coordination with countries like Japan and South Korea that already dominate modern shipbuilding. This capacity gap is linked to wider concerns about national security, as Western states also struggle to ramp up basic defense production like artillery shells in the face of potential near‑peer conflicts with China and Russia.

Shipbuilding startups and automation

  • Some argue there’s a big need and potential for startups in U.S. shipbuilding, including autonomous ships and maritime drones.
  • Others say full autonomy offers limited savings because crews are already small; automation mainly improves operations, not headcount.
  • There’s skepticism that shipbuilding is a viable “startup” domain given its capital intensity and long timelines compared to software or rockets.

Industrial scale, supply chains, and materials

  • Commenters stress the difficulty of sourcing tens of thousands of tons of specialized plate steel and house-sized engines; lead times can be many years.
  • Shipbuilding is seen as a very mature industry (millennia old), with logistics and scale unlike newer sectors such as space launch.
  • Suggestions to “start small” (e.g., fishing boats) meet pushback that there’s no realistic scaling path to nuclear subs or blue‑water warships without state-backed mega-projects.
  • Ideas like concrete ships are noted but treated as curiosities, not mainstream solutions.

Labor, unions, and regulation

  • Skilled labor shortages are highlighted as a core bottleneck.
  • Unions are viewed by some as obstacles to “fail fast” startup culture; others counter that strong unions coexist with highly productive shipyards in Asia and Europe.
  • Environmental, labor, safety, and energy regulations are debated: some see them as key constraints on U.S. industrial capacity; others say offshoring was more about labor costs and corporate choices than regulation alone.

Jones Act and U.S. competitiveness

  • The Jones Act is criticized as distorting coastal trade, raising shipping costs for islands, and reducing overall U.S. shipping volume.
  • Others argue it preserves a minimal domestic shipbuilding and crewing base for national security, though its net effect on competitiveness is contested and partly unclear.

National security and capacity shortfalls

  • Reviving shipyards is framed as a national security imperative, not a profit-maximizing move.
  • U.S. naval yards are largely military-only and already heavily contractor-run.
  • Broader concern: Western industrial capacity (e.g., artillery shells, cargo ships, air defense munitions) appears insufficient for a large or prolonged great‑power war.

Autonomous, drone, and auxiliary concepts

  • Uncrewed surface vessels, large UUVs, and cheap drone boats/torpedoes are seen as promising and already emerging.
  • Turning commercial container ships into drone carriers or modular “arsenal” platforms is discussed; critics note their extreme vulnerability and lack of survivability versus dedicated warships.
  • Some argue future fleets will mix conventional ships with large numbers of expendable drones and USVs.

Global conflict and munitions production

  • Historical artillery output in WWI is contrasted with today’s struggle to ramp shell production for Ukraine, showing how peacetime economies let such capacity atrophy.
  • Ammunition supply chains now depend on niche inputs (e.g., specific cotton for gunpowder, much from China), which creates new vulnerabilities.
  • There is disagreement over whether current overlapping wars and proxy conflicts amount to a “World War III” scenario or remain below that threshold.

International relations, escalation, and alliances

  • Several comments frame industrial capacity as part of deterrence: visible weaknesses can invite escalation by adversaries.
  • World War I is referenced as a classic case of escalation dynamics that escaped leaders’ control.
  • Recommended IR lenses include realism, “escalatory vs de‑escalatory” postures, and the role of post‑war institutional design.
  • There’s debate over the depth of the Russia–China relationship: some see a tight alliance; others describe it as transactional “frenemies” with unresolved border ambitions.

Software as a disruptor

  • Software is proposed as the most realistic way to “disrupt” shipping/shipbuilding: better control systems, logistics, and reliability.
  • At the same time, increased software dependency can introduce catastrophic failure modes, illustrated by a past U.S. Navy incident where a divide‑by‑zero bug disabled a ship.
  • Some criticize “software-ization” of everything as overshooting the point of diminishing returns, adding fragility and lock‑in.

Role of Japan and South Korea

  • South Korea, in particular, is recognized as having massive commercial shipbuilding capacity and deep expertise.
  • Cooperation is seen as a way to import know‑how and modern industrial practices to help restart or upgrade idled U.S. yards, even if core construction remains on U.S. soil for security reasons.