Automakers are sharing consumers' driving behavior with insurance companies

Automakers are increasingly using connected-car systems to collect detailed driving and location data, then selling it to data brokers like LexisNexis, which in turn provide “risk scores” to insurers that can raise or deny coverage. Commenters highlight how this is often bundled into vague, opt-in-by-default app features, with opaque scoring methods and little ability for drivers to see, contest, or stop the data flow without physically disabling hardware. The conversation centers on privacy, ownership and control of vehicle data, the limits of purely technical fixes such as encryption, and calls for strong, enforceable regulation to make surveillance truly opt‑in and constrain secondary use.

Informed consent & “opt‑in” reality

  • Many argue “opt‑in” is largely fictional: data collection is bundled into other services, hidden behind dark patterns, or requires obscure steps to disable.
  • Examples: Toyota buyers told analytics “can’t be turned off,” SOS-button opt‑outs resisted via scripts, and confusing online “consent centers.”
  • Stickers and privacy notices can be changed unilaterally, undermining any one-time consent.
  • Several note most drivers have no idea their behavior is being sold to intermediaries like LexisNexis.

Ownership, control, and software locks

  • Long subthread on whether “ownership” is a useful concept when manufacturers retain software control.
  • One side: if you bought the car, you should be able to disable tracking, remove hardware, modify components; private contracts shouldn’t override that.
  • Other side: ownership is legally defined and always constrained (e.g., emissions, safety), so the real axis is “who has control over what,” not abstract ownership.

Privacy, surveillance capitalism & regulation

  • Strong sense that connected-car tech has flipped from empowering users to enabling corporate and state surveillance.
  • Comparisons to credit bureaus, employment databases, and retail data sharing; this is seen as just another node in a large data‑broker ecosystem.
  • Split on solutions:
    • One camp calls for hard law: explicit, revocable, opt‑in only; existential fines; board‑level penalties; privacy “bill of rights.”
    • Others are skeptical regulation will be enforced effectively, citing GDPR’s enforcement gaps and heavy industry lobbying.
    • Homomorphic encryption is proposed but mostly dismissed as too slow, partial, and misaligned with corporate incentives.

Insurance use of telematics data

  • Some like risk‑based pricing: dangerous drivers pay more, safe/low‑mileage drivers less.
  • Many worries about:
    • Crude metrics (hard braking, acceleration, frequent lane changes) misclassifying defensive or skilled driving.
    • Missing context (track days, wildlife, bad maps, school zones vs empty roads, time of day).
    • Opaque scoring, no way to audit or contest data, and data being used mainly to raise rates or deny coverage.
    • Future “penalty” for refusing tracking, turning discounts into de facto surcharges.

Workarounds and resistance

  • Users share practical steps: pulling specific fuses, unplugging modems, removing antennas, choosing older/“dumb” cars, or rebuilding older vehicles.
  • Concerns these actions could be used to label drivers as higher risk or allegedly “void warranties,” though warranty law may limit that.
  • Broader nihilism from some: data collection is now default in cars; without strong law, opting out is a technical and legal cat‑and‑mouse game.