Ban the sale of precise geolocation

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Scope of Geolocation Collection and Retention

  • Commenters are alarmed by adtech and “spyware” vendors storing precise location for years (e.g., 13‑month cookies vs. 12‑year backend retention).
  • Citizen Lab’s research on ad-based surveillance tools is cited as concrete evidence that commercial ad networks are already operational intelligence systems.

Contracts, Consent, and EULAs

  • Strong disagreement over whether “contractual agreement” can legitimize collection/sale:
    • Many argue EULAs are one-sided “take it or leave it” rulebooks, not real consent.
    • Others note such adhesion contracts can still be legally valid, but cannot erase criminal liability.
  • Some want handwritten, non-transferable consent; others say burying extreme terms in EULAs should itself be criminal.

GDPR, Privacy Law, and Enforcement

  • One camp says GDPR is straightforward: don’t collect unnecessary data; get explicit, informed opt-in; don’t sell it.
  • Another camp finds GDPR vague, bureaucratic, and difficult for non-adtech businesses, especially around what counts as “essential,” jurisdiction, and industrial telemetry.
  • Consensus that enforcement is weak and adtech has driven manipulative consent popups; cookie walls are seen as industry backlash, not GDPR’s intent.

“Anonymized” Location Data

  • Strong agreement that “anonymized” precise location is a fiction:
    • Home/work patterns and large samples easily re-identify individuals.
    • Dedicated companies de-anonymize brokered datasets; “de‑anonymized” is called an oxymoron if linkage is possible.
  • Point made that any high-resolution spatiotemporal pattern is effectively a personal fingerprint.

Platforms, Architecture, and Technical Mitigations

  • Criticism that iOS/Android allow pervasive trackers; OS-level toggles and cross-app limits are seen as insufficient.
  • Proposed technical fixes:
    • Stateless proxies that strip identifiers at the edge.
    • Local-only processing for maps/fitness instead of cloud storage.

Societal Risks and Policy Proposals

  • Fears that brokers’ data enables detailed social graphs, political targeting, and state/para-state control; parallels drawn to military targeting.
  • Suggested remedies:
    • Ban sale (or even collection) of precise geolocation except for narrowly defined, core functions.
    • Make abuse of privacy a general crime, regardless of specific technique.
    • Some advocate banning targeted adtech entirely; others insist there are legitimate, voluntary use cases that should remain legal.
  • Skepticism that meaningful US reform is likely soon; some hope rests on advocacy groups and a few privacy-focused legislators.