Ban the sale of precise geolocation
Growing alarm over the sale of precise smartphone location data is driving calls for outright bans or strict warrant requirements, as people realize how easily “anonymized” movement patterns can be linked back to individuals and abused by advertisers, governments, or hostile actors. Commenters weigh the merits of approaches like GDPR-style consent, prohibiting adtech tracking altogether, or criminal liability for misuse, while noting that one-sided EULAs and weak enforcement leave users effectively unprotected. Several argue that technical and legal reforms must go beyond piecemeal fixes, since surveillance business models continuously find loopholes and location data is inherently identifying.
Scope of Geolocation Collection and Retention
- Commenters are alarmed by adtech and “spyware” vendors storing precise location for years (e.g., 13‑month cookies vs. 12‑year backend retention).
- Citizen Lab’s research on ad-based surveillance tools is cited as concrete evidence that commercial ad networks are already operational intelligence systems.
Contracts, Consent, and EULAs
- Strong disagreement over whether “contractual agreement” can legitimize collection/sale:
- Many argue EULAs are one-sided “take it or leave it” rulebooks, not real consent.
- Others note such adhesion contracts can still be legally valid, but cannot erase criminal liability.
- Some want handwritten, non-transferable consent; others say burying extreme terms in EULAs should itself be criminal.
GDPR, Privacy Law, and Enforcement
- One camp says GDPR is straightforward: don’t collect unnecessary data; get explicit, informed opt-in; don’t sell it.
- Another camp finds GDPR vague, bureaucratic, and difficult for non-adtech businesses, especially around what counts as “essential,” jurisdiction, and industrial telemetry.
- Consensus that enforcement is weak and adtech has driven manipulative consent popups; cookie walls are seen as industry backlash, not GDPR’s intent.
“Anonymized” Location Data
- Strong agreement that “anonymized” precise location is a fiction:
- Home/work patterns and large samples easily re-identify individuals.
- Dedicated companies de-anonymize brokered datasets; “de‑anonymized” is called an oxymoron if linkage is possible.
- Point made that any high-resolution spatiotemporal pattern is effectively a personal fingerprint.
Platforms, Architecture, and Technical Mitigations
- Criticism that iOS/Android allow pervasive trackers; OS-level toggles and cross-app limits are seen as insufficient.
- Proposed technical fixes:
- Stateless proxies that strip identifiers at the edge.
- Local-only processing for maps/fitness instead of cloud storage.
Societal Risks and Policy Proposals
- Fears that brokers’ data enables detailed social graphs, political targeting, and state/para-state control; parallels drawn to military targeting.
- Suggested remedies:
- Ban sale (or even collection) of precise geolocation except for narrowly defined, core functions.
- Make abuse of privacy a general crime, regardless of specific technique.
- Some advocate banning targeted adtech entirely; others insist there are legitimate, voluntary use cases that should remain legal.
- Skepticism that meaningful US reform is likely soon; some hope rests on advocacy groups and a few privacy-focused legislators.