F-35 is built for the wrong war
Critics argue that the U.S. F‑35 program has produced an extraordinarily capable stealth aircraft optimized for high-end missions, but ill-suited to emerging forms of attritional warfare dominated by cheap drones, missiles, and mass production. Commenters contrast its cost, basing vulnerability and maintenance needs with the economics and scalability of unmanned systems seen in Ukraine and the Iran conflict, and question whether the U.S. industrial base can sustain losses in a long war against a peer like China. Others counter that the F‑35 is relatively cheap per unit for its class, has performed well in recent operations, and should be retained as a high-end asset within a broader “high–low” mix that includes plentiful, expendable platforms.
F‑35’s Role and Performance
- Many see the F‑35 as highly capable at what it was designed for: stealthy deep strike, SEAD, coordination of networks and drones, and operations against sophisticated SAMs (Iran, hypothetical China).
- Others argue it’s a “jack of all trades” compromise whose strengths are overkill for most current tasks and whose maintenance and basing needs make it brittle in a long, high‑attrition war.
- Several comments echo the article’s suggested fix: keep a smaller F‑35 fleet for niche, high‑end missions and shift marginal spending to cheaper, expendable platforms.
Cost, Production, and Logistics
- Disagreement over economics: some say unit procurement is now comparable to or cheaper than 4th‑gen fighters (F‑15EX, Eurofighter, Rafale, Gripen) thanks to scale; others point to much higher lifetime and per‑flight‑hour costs, limited availability, and slow software integration.
- Production is ~150–200 jets/year; critics argue this cannot be surged in wartime, while defenders note no peer fighter is built faster and pilots, not airframes, will be the bottleneck.
- Basing vulnerability is a recurring concern: concentrated, high‑value jets plus specialized infrastructure are seen as easy targets for missiles and drones.
Quantity vs. Quality and the Drone Shift
- Strong theme: modern wars (Ukraine, Iran, Red Sea) show “quantity is a quality” — mass cheap drones and munitions, short OODA loops, and distributed manufacturing.
- Counter‑argument: truly long‑range, survivable, high‑payload drones converge toward missile‑like costs (~high 5–6 figures+), so cheap swarms have limits against serious air defenses.
- Consensus that a high–low mix is needed: exquisite manned platforms plus large numbers of cheap drones, interceptors, and gun/laser C‑UAS systems.
Lessons from Ukraine and Iran
- Ukraine is cited as a case of air parity and entrenched fronts where manned aircraft are mostly stand‑off bomb trucks and drones dominate tactical attrition.
- Iran war: F‑35s and other high‑end systems achieved air dominance and tactical success, but Iran still imposes real costs via missiles/drones and the Strait of Hormuz blockade.
- Several argue the US is burning through scarce interceptors (Patriot, THAAD, SM‑series) faster than industry can replenish, exposing industrial‑base fragility.
China/Taiwan and Great‑Power War
- Some think F‑35 is “the right jet” for a US–China conflict (SEAD, enabling B‑21 and standoff strikes); others say any major US–China war would be unwinnable or nuclear‑constrained, making the whole framing suspect.
- Debate over whether Chinese satellites, drones, and missiles can reliably find and overwhelm carrier groups; tracking and targeting in the vast Pacific is seen as a hard, unsolved problem.
Procurement, Politics, and Ethics
- Repeated criticism of the US military‑industrial complex: revolving door appointments, pork‑driven subcontracting in many districts, projects chronically late and over budget.
- Some defend big programs as a way to preserve advanced engineering capability between wars.
- Several comments question the morality and normalization of planning for wars with Iran or China at all, and note the opportunity cost versus domestic needs (e.g., student debt, social spending).