A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Effectiveness of KYC Against Spam/Scams

  • Many argue KYC on phone subscribers will not significantly reduce spam or scam calls, especially when calls originate from abroad or via VoIP.
  • Others claim some countries with mandatory SIM registration do see reduced abuse and easier enforcement, but concrete evidence is disputed.
  • Examples: Italy reportedly has mandatory KYC yet still high spam; UK/NL may have stricter SIM rules that make SMS farms riskier.
  • Several point out that any benefit would also require aggressive enforcement and real penalties for abusive carriers, which they doubt will happen.

Privacy, Surveillance, and Abuse Risks

  • Strong concern that mandatory phone KYC expands “PII honeypots” at telcos that already have histories of breaches, data sales, and warrantless sharing.
  • Critics see this as a step toward mass location tracking and easier targeting of political speech or “undesirables.”
  • KYC is framed as an end-run around due process, outsourcing investigative power to private firms without meaningful recourse for users.

Caller ID Spoofing and SHAKEN/STIR

  • Many argue the real fix is preventing caller ID spoofing and dropping unverified calls, not tying numbers to identities.
  • Discussion of SHAKEN/STIR: partial deployment, big loopholes for legacy/TDM and small or foreign carriers, and limited consumer tools (e.g., red-flagged calls).
  • Some suggest default-blocking of non–A-level attested or legacy-route calls, with opt-in for those needing them, but note telcos profit from spam volumes.

Anonymity vs Accountability

  • Tension between users who want anonymous/prepaid lines and others who want every caller traceable to a person.
  • Proposed compromises: allow anonymous calls but mark them clearly and let recipients auto-block; or rely on traceability via payment methods instead of identity directly stored by telcos.

Broader Critiques of KYC/AML and Phone Numbers

  • Parallels drawn to banking KYC/AML: seen as expanding control over who can transact, while sophisticated criminals bypass it.
  • Phone numbers are described as expensive, overused identifiers and insecure 2FA channels; some advocate moving to new, disposable or URL-based identifiers.

Process and Civic Action

  • Several share direct links and docket numbers for submitting comments to the FCC and Federal Register.
  • Some object that public comment systems require real-name, publicly visible submissions and use reCAPTCHA, which they see as participation barriers.