A Call to Action: Stop the FCC's KYC Regime

A proposed FCC rule to impose “know your customer” identity checks on all phone and VoIP users is prompting backlash from people who see it as expanding mass surveillance while doing little to curb robocalls and scams. Commenters argue that phone companies already mishandle sensitive data and that existing tools like STIR/SHAKEN and stricter enforcement against bad carriers would be more effective than tying every phone number to verified personal identity. Others counter that traceability is necessary to hold abusers accountable, highlighting a broader tension between privacy, security, and the desire to reduce spam.

Effectiveness of KYC Against Spam/Scams

  • Many argue KYC on phone subscribers will not significantly reduce spam or scam calls, especially when calls originate from abroad or via VoIP.
  • Others claim some countries with mandatory SIM registration do see reduced abuse and easier enforcement, but concrete evidence is disputed.
  • Examples: Italy reportedly has mandatory KYC yet still high spam; UK/NL may have stricter SIM rules that make SMS farms riskier.
  • Several point out that any benefit would also require aggressive enforcement and real penalties for abusive carriers, which they doubt will happen.

Privacy, Surveillance, and Abuse Risks

  • Strong concern that mandatory phone KYC expands “PII honeypots” at telcos that already have histories of breaches, data sales, and warrantless sharing.
  • Critics see this as a step toward mass location tracking and easier targeting of political speech or “undesirables.”
  • KYC is framed as an end-run around due process, outsourcing investigative power to private firms without meaningful recourse for users.

Caller ID Spoofing and SHAKEN/STIR

  • Many argue the real fix is preventing caller ID spoofing and dropping unverified calls, not tying numbers to identities.
  • Discussion of SHAKEN/STIR: partial deployment, big loopholes for legacy/TDM and small or foreign carriers, and limited consumer tools (e.g., red-flagged calls).
  • Some suggest default-blocking of non–A-level attested or legacy-route calls, with opt-in for those needing them, but note telcos profit from spam volumes.

Anonymity vs Accountability

  • Tension between users who want anonymous/prepaid lines and others who want every caller traceable to a person.
  • Proposed compromises: allow anonymous calls but mark them clearly and let recipients auto-block; or rely on traceability via payment methods instead of identity directly stored by telcos.

Broader Critiques of KYC/AML and Phone Numbers

  • Parallels drawn to banking KYC/AML: seen as expanding control over who can transact, while sophisticated criminals bypass it.
  • Phone numbers are described as expensive, overused identifiers and insecure 2FA channels; some advocate moving to new, disposable or URL-based identifiers.

Process and Civic Action

  • Several share direct links and docket numbers for submitting comments to the FCC and Federal Register.
  • Some object that public comment systems require real-name, publicly visible submissions and use reCAPTCHA, which they see as participation barriers.