Stop Killing the Internet: No Digital ID and No Age Verification

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

A European citizens’ initiative calling to “stop killing the internet” by banning mandatory digital IDs and online age verification has triggered a wider debate over privacy, surveillance, and child protection. Many commenters accept that governments and platforms need some way to verify identity or age, but argue that tying this to real-world IDs risks centralized tracking, censorship, and abuse of power, especially if data is reused across services. Others counter that parental controls have failed at scale, the internet is increasingly overrun by bots and harmful content, and that privacy-preserving schemes such as zero‑knowledge proofs or segregated “kids’ internets” might offer compromise, though critics doubt they would be implemented or enforced in a trustworthy way.

Scope and framing of the initiative

  • Several commenters argue the title (“No Digital ID and No Age Verification”) is misleading or “populist”; the actual text seeks voluntary, privacy-preserving IDs and age checks, not an outright ban.
  • Some think including requirements like non-digital alternatives and strict controls on relying parties could make the proposal politically or practically unworkable.

Digital ID: necessity vs risks

  • Pro-ID side:
    • Governments and “government-ish” services need a reliable, cheap online identity mechanism (e.g., for banking, referendums, voting).
    • Properly designed with data minimization, selective disclosure, open source, and audits, digital ID could help against bots, sockpuppets, and foreign propaganda.
  • Anti-/skeptical side:
    • Fears of mass surveillance, cross-service tracking, and future abuse by less benign governments.
    • Even privacy-preserving designs can be eroded once the infrastructure exists.
    • Mandatory ID for everyday internet use is seen as a direct threat to civil liberties.

Age verification and child protection

  • Broad agreement that kids are overexposed to harmful or addictive content; disagreement on solutions.
  • One camp: governments must act; “parental responsibility” alone has failed, and many parents lack capacity or tools.
  • Other camp: this is primarily a parenting problem; tools like device-level controls, kid-specific devices, and app restrictions are preferable to universal ID schemes.
  • Skepticism that “secure and anonymous” age verification is possible at scale without either easy credential sharing or draconian hardware/OS controls.

Anonymity, accountability, and speech

  • Many defend anonymity/pseudonymity as essential for dissent, whistleblowing, and marginalized communities.
  • Others want spaces where real-world identity is the norm to counter bots and “toxic culture,” but are wary of state-mandated identity.
  • Comparison with physical ID checks: offline checks are ephemeral; online checks create permanent, correlatable datasets.

Technical proposals and doubts

  • Ideas floated:
    • Zero-knowledge proofs and anonymous proof-of-age.
    • Client-side parental controls plus standardized content metadata.
    • Separate “kids-only” sites and hardware.
  • Counterarguments:
    • ZK solutions don’t solve sybil/credential-sharing issues.
    • Strong technical controls risk “ending open computing.”
    • Any partial solution may quickly be extended into broader surveillance.

EU process and legitimacy

  • Some see EU citizens’ initiatives as weak: 1M signatures in a 450M population only guarantee a formal response, not action.
  • Others note that, compared to corporate lobbying, even a small organized minority already has outsized influence.

State of the internet and AI/bots

  • Several commenters think the web is already “dying” under bots, LLM-generated content, and engagement-optimized platforms.
  • This fuels both:
    • Calls for stronger identity to keep “real humans” visible.
    • Calls to resist IDs and instead build alternative, decentralized or anonymous networks outside state and platform control.