NTSB issues investigative update on B-767 runway excursion accident in Miami
An investigative update on the Amazon-contracted 21 Air Boeing 767 crash in Miami points to an unstable, high-speed approach and a disastrously late, then aborted, go-around attempt, despite multiple cues and standard “stabilized approach” criteria that should have triggered a wave-off well before touchdown. Commenters focus on breakdowns in crew resource management — including a first officer who warned about excessive speed but did not force a go-around — and how organizational culture, fatigue, and “get-there-itis” can erode safety even in highly regulated aviation environments. Technical factors such as tailwinds, delayed flap configuration, one main gear staying light on touchdown (preventing spoilers and autobrakes from activating), and turbofan spool-up time are examined, alongside calls for stronger safety culture, better training, and possibly future AI-based safeguards.
Accident overview & NTSB update
- Cargo 767 overran the runway in Miami, killing five.
- NTSB data: approach was fast and unstable; aircraft touched down long, with nose and right main gear first and left main delayed.
- Flight Data Recorder showed no deployment of speed brakes/spoilers or thrust reversers; brakes were applied, briefly released for a go‑around attempt, then reapplied.
Unstable approach & missed go-arounds
- Multiple commenters say stabilized-approach criteria were violated well before 1,000 ft AGL: too high, too fast, late descent, glide slope not captured, landing configuration not set in time.
- Several pilots argue there were many “mandatory go‑around” triggers that were ignored.
- Strong view that the real failure was not going around early; later toggling between landing and go‑around is seen as fatal indecision.
Technical landing factors
- Aircraft likely had excess energy: high speed, high descent rate, and light weight leading to floating in ground effect.
- Delayed touchdown and one main gear staying light meant weight‑on‑wheels sensors didn’t trigger spoilers/autobrakes or reversers.
- Quartering tailwind mentioned; some see it as minor versus energy management and airmanship.
- Turbofan spool‑up lag (several seconds) explained why a very late go‑around command didn’t produce immediate acceleration.
Crew dynamics and CRM
- CVR indicates one pilot repeatedly called out excessive speed; the flying pilot did not consistently respond.
- Debate over whether the monitoring pilot should have forcefully ordered or executed a go‑around.
- Many see this as a classic breakdown of crew resource management and authority gradient, echoing past accidents and dramatized portrayals.
Operational pressure and corporate culture
- Some argue US airlines don’t penalize go-arounds and that safety culture and regulation make “no go‑around” pressure unlikely.
- Others cite “get‑there‑itis,” fatigue, and alleged practices at the cargo operator/Amazon contractors as possible implicit pressures, though concrete evidence in this case is unclear.
Broader implications
- Discussion of whether AI or additional automation should block grossly unsafe landings.
- Emphasis from multiple pilots: discipline on approach and a low‑friction go‑around culture are central safety defenses.