UK government forced to admit it issued Apple a secret encryption order

The UK government has been forced to admit it secretly ordered Apple to maintain a technical capability to access encrypted iCloud data, after Apple withdrew its Advanced Data Protection feature for new users in the UK rather than weaken end‑to‑end encryption. Commenters debate whether Apple can be trusted as a privacy champion given its control over closed-source platforms and its past concessions to other governments, and whether any cloud service can meaningfully protect users from state surveillance. The episode is framed as part of a wider trend of expanding secret investigatory powers in the UK, where legal and constitutional structures offer relatively weak protections for privacy and free expression.

Apple, iCloud, and Encryption Assurances

  • Many argue Apple’s privacy posture is marketing-heavy and structurally untrustworthy: closed-source OS, opaque iCloud, and prior willingness to move iCloud keys to China.
  • Others counter that Apple has resisted explicit backdoors (e.g. withdrawing features like Advanced Data Protection in the UK rather than weaken them) and that this case reflects government pressure, not Apple’s choice.
  • Debate over wording: earlier “nobody, not even Apple” vs newer formulations like “Apple cannot access your data.” Some see this as honest legal tightening; others call it misleading given key-escrow–like realities for non‑ADP data.

Technical Capability Notice (TCN) and Government Secrecy

  • The UK was forced to admit issuing a TCN to Apple; the notice’s contents remain secret.
  • Some see any secret, standing power to weaken/bypass encryption as inherently illegitimate and incompatible with a free society.
  • Others steelman secrecy as necessary for long-running investigations, though even they often support eventual disclosure and post‑hoc accountability.

Advanced Data Protection (ADP) and UK Users

  • ADP (E2EE for most iCloud data) can no longer be newly enabled in the UK; existing users keep it for now but are expected to be pressured to turn it off.
  • Several posters stress this is precisely because Apple refused to create a backdoor; critics respond that removing the option is still a major degradation for UK users.

Trust, Threat Models, and Alternatives

  • Core point: if your threat model includes your own government, any cloud service is risky regardless of vendor promises.
  • Strong skepticism that closed platforms can resist state coercion, given remote update channels and gag powers.
  • Alternatives raised: self-hosting, Linux phones, GrapheneOS; pushback notes worse UX and that these do not solve cloud-side access.

UK, US, and Civil Liberties Context

  • UK criticized as a leading surveillance state with weak structural rights protections (no strong constitutional court, broad parliamentary sovereignty, Five Eyes ties).
  • Some argue many UK citizens actively support expansive surveillance; others say elites and security services drive it.
  • Comparison with the US: both have secret orders and gagging (e.g. push notification data), but legal frameworks and public attitudes differ.