Submarine cables linking Africa-Asia-Europe severed
Multiple major submarine cables in the Red Sea linking Africa, Asia and Europe have been severed, disrupting traffic and forcing some South Asian routes to detour via the US and Japan. Commenters examine how difficult and risky it will be to repair the cables in an active war zone, noting the limited number of specialized ships, safety concerns, and the need for possible military escort. They also debate likely culprits and motives, broader norms around undersea infrastructure sabotage, and whether satellite or mesh networking technologies can meaningfully supplement or back up such critical links.
Technical aspects and repair logistics
- Repairing damaged subsea cables is described as specialized, costly, and risky, especially in an active war zone.
- Some argue cable ships are usually available and cuts on major cables are fixed within days; others claim such ships are booked far in advance.
- Operating in the Red Sea now likely requires naval escort and possibly air defense, increasing costs and risk.
- There is speculation that military engineering units might be needed if civilian crews refuse to work under fire.
How cables can be cut
- Suggested mechanisms include dragging anchors along the seabed and using underwater drones.
- The Bab-el-Mandeb strait is relatively shallow, making both accidental and deliberate damage easier.
- Examples from other regions (Caribbean, Baltic, Taiwan area) are cited where ship anchors or yachts have damaged cables.
Attribution, motives, and geopolitics
- The thread is divided on who is responsible: Houthis (who previously threatened cables), state actors (US, Israel, Iran, Russia, China), or accidental damage.
- Some see this as likely Houthi action aligned with their broader anti-US/anti-Israel stance and Red Sea attacks.
- Others emphasize the article offers little direct evidence and warn against quick attribution.
- Comparisons are made to Nord Stream, with similar debates about responsibility, plausible deniability, and political incentives not to conclusively blame specific states.
- Some participants frame this as part of a proxy conflict involving Iran and Western allies; others argue many actors share responsibility for regional instability.
Impact on connectivity and redundancy
- Users in South Asia report traffic rerouting via the US and Japan, implying increased latency but not total outage.
- Multiple cables (EIG, AAE-1, Seacom, TGN-EA) are reported as affected in the Red Sea segment between East Africa and Egypt/Saudi Arabia.
- Consensus: redundancy exists, but the Red Sea route is latency-critical for Europe–Asia/Africa links, so repeated cuts could be serious.
Satellites and alternative networks
- Satellite systems (e.g., Starlink/Starshield) are discussed as partial backup, but current satellite capacity is seen as far below the tens of Tbps carried by major cables.
- Space-based backhaul may be attractive for military or niche use but not yet a full replacement.
- Community mesh networks, LoRa-based projects (like Meshtastic), HAM radio, and other P2P networks are mentioned as resilience ideas, but spectrum, regulations, and bandwidth limits make large-scale alternatives difficult.